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SUMMARY
Sketching techniques are widely adopted in network applications. Sketching algorithms
“encode” data into succinct data structures that can later be accessed and “decoded” for
various purposes, such as network measurement, accounting, anomaly detection and etc.
Bloom filters and counter braids are two well-known representatives in this category. Those
sketching algorithms usually need to strike a tradeoff between performance (how much in-
formation can be revealed and how fast) and cost (storage, transmission and computation).
This dissertation is dedicated to the research and development of several sketching tech-
niques including improved forms of stateful Bloom Filters, Statistical Counter Arrays and
Error Estimating Codes.
Bloom filter is a space-efficient randomized data structure for approximately represent-
ing a set in order to support membership queries. Bloom filter and its variants have found
widespread use in many networking applications, where it is important to minimize the cost
of storing and communicating network data. In this thesis, we propose a family of Bloom
Filter variants augmented by rank-indexing method. We will show such augmentation can
bring a significant reduction of space and also the number of memory accesses, especially
when deletions of set elements from the Bloom Filter need to be supported.
Exact active counter array is another important building block in many sketching al-
gorithms, where storage cost of the array is of paramount concern. Previous approaches
reduce the storage costs while either losing accuracy or supporting only passive measure-
ments. In this thesis, we propose an exact statistics counter array architecture that can
support active measurements (real-time read and write). It also leverages the aforemen-
tioned rank-indexing method and exploits statistical multiplexing to minimize the storage
xiii
costs of the counter array.
Error estimating coding (EEC) has recently been established as an important tool to es-
timate bit error rates in the transmission of packets over wireless links. In essence, the EEC
problem is also a sketching problem, since the EEC codes can be viewed as a sketch of the
packet sent, which is decoded by the receiver to estimate bit error rate. In this thesis, we will
first investigate the asymptotic bound of error estimating coding by viewing the problem
from two-party computation perspective and then investigate its coding/decoding efficiency
using Fisher information analysis. Further, we develop several sketching techniques includ-
ing Enhanced tug-of-war(EToW) sketch and the generalized EEC (gEEC)sketch family
which can achieve around 70% reduction of sketch size with similar estimation accuracies.
For all solutions proposed above, we will use theoretical tools such as information the-
ory and communication complexity to investigate how far our proposed solutions are away
from the theoretical optimal. We will show that the proposed techniques are asymptotically




In this dissertation research, we will focus on analyzing and improving several “sketching”
algorithms which are important in a wide variety of network applications. Those sketching
algorithms “encode” the information of packets into some succinct data structures which
will be later accessed and “decoded” for various purposes, such as network measurement,
accounting and anomaly detection. Bloom Filter, statistics counter array and error estimat-
ing codes are three such sketch data structures, which will be the focus of this dissertation
research. Bloom Filter[5] is a data structure which approximately encodes the information
of a set for set membership queries. Applications which employs the Bloom Filter can
query the Bloom Filter to “decode” whether an arbitrary item belongs to the Bloom Filter.
Statistics counter array (such as counter braids [46]) is a data structure that encodes the
values of an array of statistics counters approximately or accurately. Applications which
employ this data structure need to “decode” the counter value(s) either online or offline.
Error estimating code [13] is a data structure which partially encodes the information of
a packet, in such a way that if certain number of bits in the packet are flipped later on,
this number can be estimated from the code. In summary, those sketching algorithms all
succinctly encodes certain information about packets for later accesses.
Those sketching algorithms play an fundamentally important role in overcoming major
resource bottlenecks in networking applications. The most typical bottleneck in high-speed
router applications is the limited amount of expensive on-chip memory (SRAM), the lim-
ited bandwidth and high latency between on-chip processors and off-chip memory, and
the limited off-chip memory size. In web caching and network measurement [9, 22, 10],
Bloom Filters[5] are therefore employed to filter out invalid lookups to the slower external
1
or remote memories or disks, which will greatly save the bandwidth to the slower storage
devices. As for the statistics counter array problem, since it is too costly to naı̈vely im-
plement the counter array on the scale of millions of flows, several different algorithms,
such as counter braids [46], approximate counting[17] , have been proposed to make more
efficient utilizations of the precious on-chip resources.The last problem we will visit in this
thesis is the error estimating code problem[13], which was proposed to enable the receiver
to directly infer bit error rate from the received packet and codes, overcomes the limita-
tion that the MAC layer can only infer the bit error rate from either indirect sources such
as packet loss ratio or S/N ratio or from some special hardware such as the SoftPHY in
[64, 36].
Due to such resource limitations, the implementation of those sketching algorithms
need to strike a tradeoff between performance (how much information can be revealed and
how fast) and cost (storage, transmission and computation). Although the three sketching
problems listed above, Bloom Filter, counter array and error estimating code, look different
from the perspective of either design or application area, and the limitations/bottlenecks
faced by those three applications are also not identical, they share similar characteristics
from an algorithmic perspective: smaller sketching size is important (with the same or
better functionalities) for saving either the precious on-chip resources or the transmission
overhead.
Although the sketching algorithms mentioned above are motivated and proposed al-
ready with better space efficiency in mind, we found that they are far from the optimal,
especially when some additional functionalities need to be supported. The theme of this
dissertation research is not to propose new sketching problems, but to explore the space-
saving and performance-improving spaces for those established important sketching prob-
lems from a practical algorithmic perspective. In short, we aim to design space-efficient
solutions for the three problems listed above.
In general, for all three problems listed above, we will follow the same methodology.
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First, we will thoroughly analyze the existing solution(s) and identify some promising
directions. Second, we will design new solution(s) often with intuitions and techniques
brought in from some other areas. We will see that although the underlying problems are
very different from one another, they share some key ideas and techniques such as “statis-
tical multiplexing” and rank-indexing.
Third, we will rigourously analyze the average or statistically worst-cases of the scheme
and will optimize and evaluate our proposed solutions based on these analysis results. Fi-
nally, we will explore the question of how far the proposed solutions are from the optimal
in theory, which might shed light on further innovations.
In the next three subsections, we will highlight our storylines on the three aforemen-
tioned sketching problems followed by organization of the thesis.
1.1 Highlights of this thesis
1.1.1 Bloom Filter Alternative
We first apply the methodology presented above on the Bloom filter problem. Bloom Filter
is a space-efficient randomized data structure for approximating a set in order to support
membership queries. Bloom filter and its variants have found widespread use in many net-
working applications [9]. The most classical and typical application scenario of Bloom
Filter serves as pre-lookup filter before a lookup into a large table in slower memory/disk.
Bloom filter can filter out most of the invalid requests (requests for items that are not in
the table) and hence be able to greatly reduce the traffic into slower memory/disk. Bloom
Filter is also widely employed in many newly proposed designs, including web caching,
packet/resource routing, P2P collaborating, network measurement, deep packet inspection,
etc. Whenever and wherever a succinct data sketch is needed and approximation is al-
lowed, usually Bloom Filter will be a good candidate, while how much improvement in
performance can be achieved depends on the particular application scenario. In most ap-
plications scenarios of Bloom Filter, it is important to reduce space cost.
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The original design of Bloom Filter is just a binary array with k hash functions and
supports insertion only. Due to its wide applicabilities, many variants, such as counting
Bloom filter (CBF) [22], Spectral Bloom Filter [14], the Approximate Concurrent State
Machine [6] (also called a stateful Bloom filter), the Bloomier filter [11], etc, have been
proposed to support versatile additional functionalities and can be optimized for different
application scenarios.
Due to the fundamental importance of Bloom Filter, we start this dissertation work by
re-visiting the Bloom Filter design and find that the Bloom Filter problem should have
the potential to be further improved from the memory-saving perspective. We start with an
alternative approach to Bloom filter design, namely the fingerprint hash-table, and augment
it with a special bit-operation trick called rank-indexed hashing. We will show this family
of constructions result in a significant reduction in space and less memory accesses and
better memory access locality, especially when deletions need to be supported. We will also
employ some large-deviation techniques to perform a tail-bound analysis of the proposed
scheme.
1.1.2 Exact Active Counter Array
The next problem we will visit is the design of exact active counter array. Statistical counter
array is another important building block in many sketching applications, where is also im-
portant to save storage cost. Large-scale array of counters (millions or more) are needed in
schemes ranging from the basic packet counting features of core network devices to some
advanced network data streaming algorithms for network measurement and troubleshoot-
ing. Previous approaches can reduce the storage cost in cost of either losing accuracy or
only supporting passive measurements[56, 53, 55, 70, 49, 17, 58].
In Chapter 3, we will propose an exact and active solution. Similar to the Bloom filter
built through rank-indexed hashing, our proposed solution also leverages the rank-indexing
method and exploits statistical multiplexing to save the storage costs of counter values. A
4
tail-bound analysis of the worst case scenarios is provided. Different from the Bloom Filter
case, the information theory limit of the counter array problem is non-trivial and hence we
will research this limit from a few different angles.
1.1.3 Error Estimating Coding
The third problem we will visit in this dissertation is the design and analysis of error es-
timating coding. Error estimating coding (EEC) [13] has recently been established as
an important tool to estimate bit error rates in the transmission of packets over wireless
links. The concept of EEC breaks the long-held design philosophy that only wants to deal
with fully correct data, through the correction capability provided by error correcting code
(ECC). In contrast of ECC, EEC aims to use much smaller overhead to only estimate the
number of errors while not correct them. It was shown in [13] that, if the BER in pack-
ets can be accurately estimated, important operations in wireless networks such as packet
re-scheduling, routing, and carrier selection can all be performed with greater efficiency.
In essence, the EEC codeword is a sketch of the packet. The receiver will decode the
binary error rate from the packet received by “comparing” the received data part and sketch
part. Following the same methodology as the previous problems we have visited, it’s nat-
ural to ask how good is the existing solution proposed in [13] and whether possible to
improve it. In Chapter 4, we visit the EEC problem from a few different angles. Firstly, we
cast this BER estimation problem into the rich theoretical framework of two-party compu-
tation. This perspective will bring us a proof of the asymptotic optimality of the original
scheme and also intuitions in designing new sketch. We found that a classical solution to
the two-party computation of hamming distance, tug-of-war sketch, although not directly
applicable, can be leveraged to build a new sketching scheme, which we called Enhanced
tug-of-war (EToW) sketch. EToW sketch can deliver similar performance with around
60% reduction of size, along with some additional benefits such as simpler estimator and
numerically predictable performance.
5
Secondly, we follow up with a deeper and more important question whether EEC has
achieved the desired optimal space-accuracy tradeoff. We leveraged the Fisher informa-
tion analysis tool to analyze the potential of the original EEC design and find that actually
the variance achieved by the original EEC’s estimator is much larger than the Cramer-Rao
lower bound, which means there’s a lot of inefficiency inside the original EEC’s estima-
tor. We hence proposed a new estimator which is close to Cramer-Rao bound empirically.
Moreover, we further find that the EToW sketch newly proposed by us and the original EEC
sketch can subsumed into a generalized family of sketches, which we call generalized-EEC
(gEEC) family. We developed an analysis framework and estimator for gEEC, which shed
light on deeper understanding of the problem. Through the unified framework of gEEC,
we found that some parameterizations of gEEC (similar to EToW, but not needing the ex-
tra sketch error detection bits) can further improve the estimation efficiency by another
25-35 % under certain circumstances. Moreover, gEEC can be flexibly configured for dif-
ferent scenarios than its two “degenerate” cases (EEC and EToW).
1.2 Thesis Organization
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, we will present our
rank-index hashing construction of Bloom Filter. We will first overview the problem in
Section 2.1. Section 2.2 summarizes background material on Bloom filters and fingerprint
hash table constructions. Section 2.3 describes our rank-indexed hashing method, which
will be also the foundation of the BRICK scheme to be presented in Section 3.3. Sec-
tion 2.4 establishes tail bound probabilities that allow us to bound and optimize the storage
cost. Section 2.5 evaluates our scheme by presenting numerical results under various pa-
rameter settings, including results for both standard and counting Bloom filters. Section 2.6
combines the rank-indexing with the d-left hashing to obtain more savings in memory cost.
Chapter 3 presents our rank-indexing-based statistics counter architecture. We firstly
overviews the problem in Section 3.1 . In Section 3.3, we describe the design of our scheme
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in detail. In Section 3.4, we establish the tail probabilities that allow us to bound and opti-
mize the SRAM requirement. In Section 3.5, we derive several lower bounds on memory
usage for counters to help us understand how far we are from the optimal. In Section 3.6,
we evaluate our scheme by presenting numerical results on memory costs and tail proba-
bilities under various parameter settings, including those extracted from real-world traffic
traces.
Chapter 4 presents our approaches and results on error estimating coding. The EEC
problem and our approaches are firstly overviewed in Section 4.1.Problem statement, no-
tations, some background presentation and the related work most pertinent to this disser-
tation work are presented in Section 4.2. In section 4.3 we analyze the asymptotic lower
bounds of error estimating codes, in terms of the number of overhead bits needed. Sec-
tion 4.4 describes the tug-of-war sketch, and gives a simple analysis to show that it can
accurately computes BER if the sketch is not corrupted by errors. In Section 4.5, we pro-
pose our enhanced tug-of-war sketch that removes the assumption of integrity of the sketch
and substantially improves its performance. In Section 4.6, we move on to use the Fisher
information tool to analyze the original EEC algorithm. In Section 4.7, we propose the
generalized EEC scheme and provide the corresponding analysis, estimator design and nu-
merical results. We evaluate the performance experimentally in Section 4.8.
We conclude the thesis and discuss possible directions of future work in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER II
RANK-INDEXED HASHING: COMPACT CONSTRUCTION AND
ENHANCEMENT OF BLOOM FILTER
2.1 Problem Overview
A Bloom filter [5] is a space-efficient randomized data structure for approximating a set in
order to support membership queries. Although a Bloom filter may yield false positives,
saying an element is in the set when it is not, it provides a very compact representation that
can be configured to achieve sufficient accuracies for many applications. For a false posi-
tive probability of ε, an optimal configuration only requires 1.44(log 1/ε) bits per element,
independent of the number of elements in the set. For example, to achieve a false positive
probability of ε = 1%, only 10 bits of storage per element is required.
In recent years, there has been a huge surge in the popularity of Bloom filters and
variants, especially for network applications [9]. One variant is the counting Bloom filter
(CBF) [22], which allows the set to change dynamically via insertions and deletions of ele-
ments. Other generalizations of Bloom filters include Spectral Bloom Filter [14], which can
encode approximate counts, the Approximate Concurrent State Machine [6] (also called a
stateful Bloom filter), which can encode state information, and the Bloomier filter [11],
which can encode arbitrary functions by allowing one to associate values with a subset of
the domain elements. In general, many Bloom filter variants that permit the association
of values to elements mainly differ in the way how they encode and interpret the values
associated.
Although a standard Bloom filter construction is very space-efficient for simple mem-
bership queries, it is actually rather inefficient when generalized to support deletions or the
encoding of information. In particular, in the standard Bloom filter construction, an array
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of m bits is used to represent a set S of n elements, where m is chosen to be sufficiently
large to ensure a small false positive probability. For example, for a false positive probabil-
ity of ε = 1%, m is chosen to be 10 times n, resulting in an amortized storage cost of 10 bits
per element. When this standard construction is generalized to encode additional informa-
tion, an array of m locations is used instead of bits. For example, in the counting Bloom
filter application where a counter is associated with each location to support insertions and
deletions, four counter bits are often used to provide a sufficient level of accuracy [22].
However, this blows up the storage requirement by a factor of four over a standard Bloom
filter.
Alternatively, it is well-known that a hash table construction with fingerprints can be
used to provide the same functionality as a Bloom filter [9]. In particular, if the set S is
static and a perfect hash function can be constructed for a hash table with n locations, then
storing a fingerprint with only dlog 1/εe bits for each element at the corresponding loca-
tion would suffice to achieve a false positive probability of ε. Moreover, for Bloom filter
generalizations that support values associations, the encoding of the additional information
only needs to be stored once at the corresponding hash table location rather than requiring
the encoding of information across multiple locations as required in a standard Bloom fil-
ter construction, resulting in substantial savings in space. However, unfortunately, perfect
hashing is very difficult to construct and does not support dynamically changing sets.
In this thesis, we propose a new fingerprint hash table construction called Rank-Indexed
Hashing that provides a compact replacement for Bloom filters, counting Bloom filters,
and other Bloom filter variants. Conceptually, our starting point is a conventional chaining-
based hash table scheme. However, our proposed solution avoids the costly overhead of
pointer storage by employing an efficient indexing scheme called rank-indexing. Actually
rank-indexing is not a brand-new technique and has been employed by [18] and [59] to
construct compact data structures. The name “rank-indexing” here is from [4], which sum-
marizes this kind of operation as rank operation. Using rank-indexed hashing construction,
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we show that it is possible to outperform a standard Bloom filter construction in storage
cost for false positive probabilities at or below just 0.1%, which is significant since a stan-
dard Bloom filter construction is widely regarded as a very space-efficient data structure for
approximate membership query problems, and it is often desirable to have a false positive
probability smaller than 0.1% in many applications.
For the counting Bloom filter application, the rank-indexed hashing construction is able
to outperform a standard counting Bloom filter construction in storage cost by a factor of
three for a false positive probability of just 1%, and it is able to outperform a recently
proposed fingerprint hash table construction called d-left hashing [7] in storage cost by 27%
at the same false positive probability. Similar storage cost benefits are expected for other
Bloom filter variants. Especially for network applications, smaller storage requirement is a
central design metric because Bloom filters are often implemented using relatively scarce
and expensive (on-chip) SRAM. Although SRAM capacity continues to increase, the rate
of traffic growth continues to outpace transistor density, leading to an ever increasing need
to reduce storage requirements.
Since rank-indexing is a technique almost orthodox to d-left hashing, we could combine
those two techniques together to get even more memory savings. However, the memory
accesses are slightly increased and the performance guarantee is also not as strict as that of
the pure rank indexed hashing.
Rank-indexed hashing also has advantages against the well-known Compressed Bloom
Filter[47]. When used for transferring purpose, Bloom Filters constructed by rank-indexed
hashing could be transferred even more compactly. If using Compressed Bloom Filter, it
would need a very large original data array to achieve the same size for transferring.
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2.2 Background and Related Works
2.2.1 Bloom Filters, Counting Bloom Filter and Compressed Bloom Filter
A Bloom filter represents a set S of n elements from a universe U using an array of m
bits, denoted by φ[1], . . . , φ[m]. Initially, all positions φ[i] are set to 0. A Bloom filter
uses a group of k independent hash functions h1, . . . , hk with range [m] = {1, . . . ,m}. Each
hash function independently maps each element in the universe to a random number chosen
uniformly over the range. For each element x ∈ S , the bits φ[hi(x)] are set to 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ k.
To check if an item x is in S , we check whether all hi(x) are set to 1. If not, then by
construction, x is not a member of S . If all hi(x) are set to 1, then x is assumed to be in S ,
which may yield a false positive.
The false positive probability for an element not in the set can be computed as
ε =
(












For example, when m/n = 10 and k = 7, the false positive probability is about 2−7 ≈ 0.008.
A Bloom filter allows for easy insertion, but not deletion. Deleting an element from a
Bloom filter cannot be done simply by reverting the corresponding ones back to zeros since
each bit may correspond to multiple elements. Deletion can be handled by using a counting
Bloom filter (CBF) [22], which uses an array of m counters instead of bits. Counters are
incremented on an insertion and decremented on a deletion. The counters are used to track
approximately the number of elements currently hashed to the corresponding locations.
To avoid overflow, counters must be chosen to be large enough. For most applications, 4
bits per counter have been shown to suffice [22]. However, the obvious disadvantage of
counting Bloom filters is that they appear to be quite wasteful of space. Using counters of
4 bits blows up the storage requirement by a factor of four over a standard Bloom filter,
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even though most counters will be zero. For example, with k = 7, 4m/n = 40 bits per
element are needed to achieve a false positive probability of about 2−7 ≈ 0.008.
Compressed Bloom Filter [47] is in fact a special application of standard Bloom Filter,
rather than a new data structure. It is discovered in [47] that, when the space of standard
Bloom Filter is minimized to 1.44kn, its compressed size, i.e. its information entropy, is
also maximized at the same time. In another word, if the space of standard Bloom Filter is
not optimized to the minimum, i.e. greater than 1.44kn, its size after compression would be
smaller than 1.44kn. The larger uncompressed size, the smaller compressed size. When the
original uncompressed space is infinitely large, the compressed size would reach the limit
kn. Hence, we could sacrifice the original space for smaller compressed size. This property
is favored for some online applications such as P2P sharing where the transferring cost is
much more important.
2.2.2 Fingerprint Hash Table Construction
An alternative construction of Bloom filters and counting Bloom filters is to use a hash
table with fingerprints. It is well known that if the set S is static, then one can achieve
essentially optimal performance by using a perfect hash function and fingerprints [9]. That
is, we can find a perfect hash function
P : U → [n]
that maps each element x ∈ S to a unique location in an array of size n, where [n] de-
notes the range {1, . . . , n}. Then, we simply need to store at each location a fingerprint with
dlog 1/εe bits that is computed according to some hash function F. A query on x requires
computing P(x) and F(x), and checking whether the fingerprint stored at P(x) matches
F(x). When x ∈ S , a correct response is given. But when x < S , a false positive occurs
with probability at most ε. This perfect hashing approach achieves the optimal space re-
quirement of dlog 1/εe bits per element. However, the problem with this approach is that











Figure 1: Hash table with chaining.
very difficult to compute for most applications.
An alternative to perfect hashing is to use an imperfect hash function. Suppose we use a
single (imperfect) hash function H : U → [B]×[R] to hash the elements in S to a hash table
with B buckets. For each element x ∈ S , H(x) returns two parts. The first part in the range
[B] corresponds to the bucket index in which the element should be placed. The second part
in the range of [R], referred to as the remainder, corresponds to a compressed fingerprint
that gets stored in the corresponding bucket. Using a single hash function, it is possible
(and likely) that two different elements x and y are mapped to the same bucket, resulting in
a collision. One way to resolve collisions is to allocate a fixed number of cells per bucket so
that the maximum load per bucket is no more than this fixed number with high probability.
However, the distribution of load using a single hash function can fluctuate dramatically
across buckets, leading to a lot of wasted space.
Another way to resolve collisions is to maintain a dynamically allocated linked list of
fingerprints that have been hashed to the same bucket, as shown in Figure 1. However, this
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conventional chained hashing approach is also rather inefficient in that the extra pointer
storage (required for each fingerprint) is very expensive. For n = 1 million elements and
a desired false positive probability of ε = 2−7, 7 bits per element would suffice assuming
perfect hashing, but another dlog ne = 20 bits would be required on average per element to
implement pointers, or another 40 bits per element to implement doubly linked list pointers
to support deletion, increasing the storage requirement by nearly seven-fold.
A third way that has been recently proposed [7] is to use a balanced allocation ap-
proach due to Vöcking [62, 63] called d-left hashing. By splitting a hash table into multi-
ple equally-sized subtables, and placing elements in the least-loaded subtable, d-left hash
tables can be dimensioned statically so that the average load per bucket is close to the
maximum load. A good configuration suggested in [7] is to use 4 subtables with a fixed
allocation corresponding to an expected maximum load of 8 fingerprints per bucket, with
an expected average load of 6 fingerprints per bucket. To check if x is in S , d-left hashing
requires checking x against all fingerprints stored in the corresponding buckets across all
the subtables, requiring the retrieval of 4 · 8 = 32 fingerprints, with matching on average
against 4 · 6 = 24 fingerprints expected. To achieve a desired false positive probability
of ε = 2−7, each cell must store a fingerprint with dlog 24/εe = dlog 24/2−7e = 12 bits,
adding 5 more bits per element to the “ideal” case of dlog 1/εe = 7 bits, which is signif-
icant. Further accounting for the expected fraction of unused cells corresponding to the
ratio of expected maximum load over average load, (8/6) · 12 = 16 bits per element would
be required, increasing over the ideal storage requirement of 7 bits by over two-fold.
2.3 Rank-Indexed Hashing
2.3.1 Basic Idea
In this section, we describe our proposed rank-indexed hashing approach. Conceptually,
our starting point is a conventional chaining-based hash table scheme. However, we employ




























Figure 2: Buckets and hash chain locations.
hashes each element in S into three parts; i.e., for each element x ∈ S , H(x) = (b, `, r).
As before, the first part b in the range of [B] corresponds to the bucket index in which the
element should be placed. The second part ` in the range of [L] corresponds to a hash
chain location within a bucket. This is conceptually depicted in Figure 2. The third part
r in the range of [R] corresponds to the (compressed) fingerprint that gets stored in the
corresponding hash chain location. In general, the number of buckets B times the number





to denote the expected average load per hash chain location. If λ = 1, then a fingerprint
with dlog 1/εe bits suffices to achieve a false positive probability of ε. In general, dlog λ/εe
bits are needed to achieve a false positive probability of ε.
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Given λ, the expected average load per bucket is simply λ ·L. Intuitively, each bucket is
dimensioned to store a fixed number of Z > (λ · L) fingerprints such that the actual load per
bucket is less than or equal to Z in a large fraction of buckets. We defer to Section 2.3.3 to
discuss the handling of cases when the actual load exceeds Z fingerprints. For the moment,
we will assume Z is chosen to ensure that actual load is less than or equal to Z with high
probability.
A key innovation in our proposed approach is an indexing method that allows us to
efficiently realize dynamic chaining at each hash chain location without the costly overhead
of pointer storage. We call this method rank-indexing, and this method is illustrated in
Figure 3. Consider a bucket with L = 8 hash chain locations, as shown in Figure 3(a).
In this example, suppose the longest chain has three fingerprints. We can conceptually
partition the fingerprints into three levels, in accordance to the depths of the fingerprints
in the corresponding chains. We then pack the fingerprints at each level together in a
corresponding contiguous subarray of fingerprints.
To locate fingerprints in a bucket, we maintain an index bitmap I. Conceptually, I is
divided into multiple parts I0, I1, . . . , Id, one part for each level of subarray. Suppose we
want to query for the fingerprint “1010101” at the hash chain location ` = 7. We first check
I0[7] to determine if there are fingerprints stored at ` = 7. If I0[7] is set to 1, as shown in a
shaded box in Figure 3(b), then it means there is a non-empty chain at ` = 7. If there are
no fingerprints at location `, then the corresponding I0[`] would be set to 0, which is shown
as a clear box.
In the example shown in Figure 3(b), the first fingerprint at ` = 7 is located at A1[3].
Rather than expending costly memory to store an explicit pointer from I0[7] to A1[3], we
dynamically compute the location by using an operator called rank(s, i), which returns the
number of ones in the range s[1] . . . s[i] in the bit-string s. Our proposed method exploits
the fact that the rank operator can be efficiently implemented using hardware-optimized





































































(Z = 12 bits)
Fingerprints
|I2| = popcnt(I1) = 2






(Z = 12 cells)
(c) Packed bucket organization.
Figure 3: Rank-indexed hashing.
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operator can be efficiently implemented by combining a bitwise-AND instruction with an-
other operation called popcount(s), which returns the number of ones in the bit-string
s. Fortunately, the popcount instruction is becoming increasingly common in modern
microprocessors and network processors. For example, current generations of 64-bit x86
processors have this popcount instruction built-in [1, 2]. As we shall see in the evaluation
section, very compact constructions can be achieved by setting L ≤ 64. Since |I0| = L, we
can directly compute rank(I0, `) using hardwired 64-bit instructions.
Continuing with the example shown in Figure 3(b), we can compute the location of the
first fingerprint at location ` = 7 in A1 by invoking a1 = rank(I0, 7), which will return
a1 = 3. We can then match against the fingerprint stored at A1[a1] = A1[3]. Similarly, we
can check if the chain has ended by checking I1[3]. If I1[3] = 1, then we can locate the
next fingerprint in A2 by computing a2 = rank(I1, 3) = 2. Given that I2[2] = 1, we can
locate the next fingerprint in the chain in A3 by computing a3 = rank(I2, 2) = 1. We see
that the fingerprint “1010101” is found at A3[1]. Further, we see that the chain has ended
since I3[1] = 0. In general, if a chain has extended beyond level j (i.e., I j[a j] = 1), then
the index location to the next subarray A j+1 can be simply computed as a j+1 = rank(I j, a j).
Observe that |I0| ≥ |I1| ≥ · · · ≥ |Id|. Therefore, if we use L ≤ 64, then all rank operations
can be directly performed using 64-bit instructions.
2.3.2 Packed Bucket Organization
Thus far above, we provided a high-level description of the idea of rank-indexed hashing.
In practice, different buckets will have varying load distributions at the different hash chain
locations, which means the number of fingerprints at each level will also fluctuate across
buckets. To take advantage of statistical multiplexing, our bucket organization packs the
subarrays of fingerprints together into a contiguous array A. This is depicted in Figure 3(c).
This way, we can dimension a bucket to store a fixed number of Z fingerprints. The Z
fingerprint locations can be shared by all the fingerprints in a bucket regardless of their
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hash chain location (i.e., regardless of which chain a fingerprint is located). We can also fix
the size of the bitmap I = I0IH to L + Z bits with L bits set aside for I0 and Z bits set aside
for IH = I1I2 . . . Id. I0 is referred to as the base index, and IH is referred to as the higher
index. In the example shown in Figure 3(c), L is fixed at 8 and Z is fixed at 12.
Using this packed bucket organization, the size of a subarray A j and the corresponding
bitmap I j may dynamically change. The current size of a subarray can be readily computed
using the popcount operator. For example, the size of A1 and I1 shown in Figure 3(c) can
be computed as popcount(I0). In general, the size of A j+1 and I j+1 can be computed as
popcount(I j).
On insertion or deletion, a fingerprint may be added or removed, respectively (e.g., in
the case of a counting Bloom filter, a fingerprint is only removed when the correspond-
ing counter has been decremented to zero). The addition or removal of a fingerprint can
increase or decrease the size of a subarray by one. To maintain the packed bucket represen-
tation, up to Z −1 fingerprints may have to be shifted in the worst-case. Here again, we can
exploit available 64-bit instructions in modern processors to expedite this shifting process.
For example, if 8 bits are used to store a remainder, then a 64-bit instruction can shift eight
fingerprints at a time. Similarly, for the bitmap IH, up to Z − 1 bits may have to be shifted
in the worst-case, but 64 bits can be shifted at a time using 64-bit instructions.
2.3.3 Quasi-Dynamic Bucket Sizing
So far, we have assumed that the fixed number of Z fingerprints allocated to each bucket
is chosen to ensure that the actual load of a bucket is less than or equal to Z with high
probability. In Table 2.3.3, we consider an example configuration in which each bucket
has L = 64 hash chain locations and λ = 0.875. In this case, λ · L = 56 is also the
expected average load. Each table entry indicates the fraction of buckets that are expected
to have actual loads greater than the corresponding specified threshold. We see that if we
set Z = 64, then only 13% of the buckets are expected to overflow. If we set Z = 74, then
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Table 1: Table entries give the fraction of buckets with actual load greater than some
threshold for a bucket with L = 64 hash chain locations and λ = 0.875. Asymptotic tail
bounds are provided for three example thresholds.
Threshold Fraction
Load > 64 0.13
Load > 74 0.01
Load > 128 8e-17
just 1% of the buckets are expected to overflow. And if we set Z = 128, then no buckets is
expected to overflow with high probability.
Suppose we set Z = 64 fingerprint cells. This means that the expected fraction of un-
used fingerprint cells is just (64/56) = 1.14, providing a high degree of space efficiency.
However, in this example, we need a way to accommodate the possibility that 13% of buck-
ets might overflow. Conceptually, when a bucket overflows, meaning that all Z fingerprint
slots are already occupied on a new insertion, we dynamically extend the bucket size by dy-
namically linking another “chunk” of memory to it. We refer to these chunks of memories
as bucket extensions. This is illustrated in Figure 4.
To make the example more concrete, suppose B = 1000. Then we can statically allocate
memory for J2 = 0.13B = 130 second-level buckets. However, these second-level buckets
are much smaller than the first-level buckets (and there are fewer number of them). In
particular, referring to Table 2.3.3, we see that just 1% of the buckets are expected to have
actual loads greater than 74. Suppose we dimension these second-level buckets to hold
Z2 = 10 fingerprints. Here, we will use Z1 rather than Z to indicate the dimensioning of the
first-level buckets: i.e., Z1 = 64. Then, for buckets that have been extended to the second-
level, Z = Z1 + Z2 = 64 + 10 = 74 fingerprints are available. In addition, the second-level
buckets will provide an additional Z2 = 10 bits for extending the higher index IH. Only the
first-level bucket needs to store the base index I0. The linkage from a first-level bucket to a
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Figure 4: Quasi-dynamic bucket sizing via bucket extensions.
since they are small relative to the size of the buckets, and bucket extensions only occur
with a small fraction of buckets. An extension flag can be used to indicate that a bucket has
been extended.
With the availability of second-level buckets, with Z = Z1 + Z2 = 74 fingerprints, then
just 1% of buckets are expected to have loads greater than two bucket levels. To accom-
modate these cases, we can statically allocate memory for J3 = 0.01B = 10 third-level
buckets. Suppose we dimension these third-level buckets to provide Z3 = 54 additional fin-
gerprints. Then, for buckets that have been extended to the third-level, Z = Z1 + Z2 + Z3 =
64 + 10 + 54 = 128 fingerprints are available. Third-level buckets will also provide an
additional Z3 = 54 bits for extending IH as well. For the parameters shown in Table 2.3.3,
as well as in practice, three bucket levels are sufficient, and each bucket level can be di-
mensioned differently.
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Once a bucket has been extended, access to the extended fingerprint array A requires
only a small modification. For example, suppose we want to access the fingerprint array
location A[Z1 + 1]. Then we simply just use the memory pointer as an offset in computing
the memory location.
2.4 Tail Bound Analysis
In this section, we establish a strict tail bound to bound the probability Po that the bucket
extensions for the overflowed buckets are insufficient.
Let random variable X(n)i , 1 ≤ i ≤ B, denote the number of fingerprints inserted in the
i-th bucket. Let O2 denote the total number of buckets overflowed into the 2nd level bucket
extension array, i.e. O2 ≡
∑B
i=1 1{X(n)i >Z1}. We want to bound the probability that O2 exceeds
the number of 2nd level bucket extensions, i.e. Pr[O2 > J2].
In general, we want to bound Pr[Ol > Jl], l = 2, 3, 4. Let W1 = Z1, W2 = Z1 + Z2 and
W3 = Z1 + Z2 + Z3. Then Ol =
∑B
i=1 1{X(n)i >Wl−1}. Here we define J4 ≡ 0, and Pr[O4 > J4]





In the following we show how to bound Pr[Ol > Jl], and we will use O,W, J instead of
Ol,Wl, Jl.
For an analogy, the statistical model for hashing n elements into B buckets is the same
as the classical balls-and-bins problem: n balls are thrown independently and uniformly at
random into B bins. Then random variable X(n)i could be translated as the number of balls
ended up in the i-th bin after n balls are thrown.
Therefore, (X(n)1 , . . . , X
(n)
B ) follows the multinomial distribution. The marginal distribu-
tion for any X(n)i is Binomial(n,
1
B), where Binomial(N, P) denotes the binomial distribution
resulting from N trials with success probability P. Since n is large and 1B is small, X
(n)
i can
be approximated by Poisson( nB), where Poisson(λ) denotes the Poisson distribution with
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parameter λ.
A naive approach to calculating the probability Pr[O > J] is to regard X(n)i as mutually
independent. In this case, the sum of the indicator of the events X(n)i > Z would be under
binomial distribution and hence could be easily bounded. However, those random variable





Fortunately, we have the following theorem to decouple the weak correlation among
(X(n)1 , . . . , X
(n)
B ) and bound our targeted probability.
Theorem 1. Let (X(n)1 , . . . , X
(n)
m ) follow the multinomial distribution of throwing n balls into
m bins. Let (Y (n)1 , . . . ,Y
(n)
m ) be independent and identically distributed random variables
with distribution Poisson( nm ). Let f (x1, . . . , xm) be a nonnegative function which is increas-
ing in each argument separately. Then
E[ f (X(n)1 , . . . , X
(n)
m )] ≤ 2E[ f (Y
(n)




Theorem 1 is derived from [48, Theorem 5.10] using stochastic ordering, which we
quote below.
Lemma 1. Let (X(n)1 , . . . , X
(n)
m ) and (Y
(n)
1 , . . . ,Y
(n)
m ) be the same as defined in Theorem 1.
Let f (x1, . . . , xm) be a nonnegative function such that E[ f (X
(n)
1 , . . . , X
(n)
m )] is monotonically
increasing in n. Then
E[ f (X(n)1 , . . . , X
(n)
m )] ≤ 2E[ f (Y
(n)




In practice, we are concerned with the probability of some event A, whose indicator ran-
dom variable is f (X(n)1 , . . . , X
(n)
m ), where n is some parameter. So Pr[A] = E[ f (X
(n)
1 , . . . , X
(n)
m )].
In most cases it is usually intuitive to say that Pr[A] increases as n increases, for example
when A is some overflowing event, but it may not be trivial to prove so. On the other hand,
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it is usually trivial to see that f is an increasing function. Therefore we introduced the
easier-to-use Theorem 1, and we will prove it using stochastic ordering.
Stochastic ordering is a way to compare two random variables. Random variable X is
stochastically less than or equal to random variable Y , written X ≤st Y , iff Eφ(X) ≤ Eφ(Y)
for all increasing functions φ such that the expectations exits. An equivalent definition of
X ≤st Y is that Pr[X > t] ≤ Pr[Y > t],−∞ < t < ∞. The definition involving increasing
functions also applies to random vectors X = (X1, ..., Xh) and Y = (Y1, ...,Yh): X ≤st Y
iff Eφ(X) ≤ Eφ(Y) for all increasing functions φ such that the expectations exits. Here φ
is increasing means that it is increasing in each argument separately with other arguments
being fixed. This is equivalent to φ(X) ≤st φ(Y). Note this definition is a much stronger
condition than Pr[X1 > t1, ..., Xh > th] ≤ Pr[Y1 > t1, ...,Yh > th] for all t = (t1, ..., th) ∈ Rn.
Now we state without proof a fact that will be used to prove Proposition 5. Its proof
can be found in all books that deal with stochastic ordering [51].
Proposition 1. Let X and Y be two random variables (or vectors). X ≤st Y iff there exists
X′ and Y ′ such that µ(X′) = µ(X), µ(Y ′) = µ(Y), and Pr[X′ ≤ Y ′] = 1. Here µ(X) means
the distribution for X.
Now we are ready to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Let (X(n)1 , X
(n)
2 , . . . , X
(n)
m ) be the same as defined in Theorem 1. For any
0 ≤ n < n′, we have
(X(n)1 , X
(n)
2 , . . . , X
(n)




2 , . . . , X
(n′)
m ).
Proof. It suffices to prove it for n′ = n + 1. Our idea is to find random variables Z and W
such that Z has the same distribution as (X(n)1 , X
(n)
2 , . . . , X
(n)
m ), W has the same distribution
as (X(n+1)1 , X
(n+1)
2 , . . . , X
(n+1)
m ), and Pr[Z ≤ W] = 1. We will use the probability model that
is generated by the “throwing n + 1 balls into m bins one-by-one” random process. Now
given any outcome ω in the probability space Ω, let Z(ω) = (Z1(ω),Z2(ω), ...,Zm(ω)), where
Z j(ω) is the number of balls in the jth bucket after we throw n balls into these m bins one by
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one. Now with all these n balls there, we throw the (n + 1)th ball uniformly randomly into
one of the bins. We define W(ω) as (W1(ω),W2(ω), ...,Wm(ω)), where W j(ω) is the number
of balls in the jth bin after we throw in the (n + 1)th ball. Clearly we have Z(ω) ≤ W(ω)
for any ω ∈ Ω and therefore Pr[Z ≤ W] = 1. Finally, we know from the property of the
“throwing n + 1 balls into m bin one-by-one” random process that Z and W have the same
distribution as (X(n)1 , X
(n)
2 , . . . , X
(n)




2 , . . . , X
(n+1)
m ) respectively. 
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.




2 , . . . , X
(n)




2 , . . . , X
(n′)
m ) by Proposition 5. By definition of stochastic
ordering, we have E[ f (X(n)1 , . . . , X
(n)
m )] ≤ E[ f (X
(n′)
1 , . . . , X
(n′)
m )]. Therefore E[ f (X
(n)
1 , . . . , X
(n)
m )]
is monotonically increasing in n, and the theorem follows from Lemma 1.

Considering the following function
f (x1, . . . , xB) = 1{(∑Bi=1 1xi>W)>J}
The targeted probability we want to bound, Pr[O > J], could be regarded as the expec-
tation of f (X(n)1 , . . . , X
(n)
B ), i.e.
Pr[O > J] = E[ f (X(n)1 , . . . , X
(n)
B )].
f (x1, . . . , xB) is obviously an increasing function. Therefore E[ f (X1, . . . , XB)] ≤ 2E[ f (Y1, . . . ,YB)],
thanks to Theorem 1.
Yi’s are distributed as Poisson( nB). Therefore Pr[Yi > W] = Poissontail(
n
B ,W), where
Poissontail(λ,K) denotes the tail probability Pr[Y > K] where Y has distribution Poisson(λ).
E[ f (Y1, . . . ,YB)] denotes the probability that more than J of the events Yi > W happen.
Since these events are mutually independent, the probability is Binotail(B, Poissontail( nB ,W), J),
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where Binotail(N, P,K) denotes the tail probability Pr[Z > K] where Z has distribution
Binomial(N, P).
So we get




Pr[O4 > J4] is a special case since J4 = 0. We do not need theorem 1, and we have a
better bound
Pr[O4 > 0] = Pr[(max
i










In this section, we present a set of numerical results computed from the tail bound theorems
that are derived in Section 2.4 and the appendix. For any targeted false positive probabil-
ity ε, we apply the tail bound theorems to derive optimal configurations under different
constraints.
One constraint we impose is on the parameter L. Ideally, larger buckets would lead to
better statistical multiplexing and better space savings. However, we constrain L to be at
most 64 to ensure that the rank and popcount operations described in Section 2.3 can be
directly implemented using hardware-optimized 64-bit instructions that are readily avail-
able in modern microprocessors and network processors. For example, current generations
of 64-bit x86 processors support such operations very efficiently [1, 2].
In Table 2, we present representative sizing results for rank-indexed hashing under dif-
ferent false positive probabilities. These sizing results assume n = 100, 000 elements and
a probability of Po = 10−10 that the bucket sizing is not enough to store new fingerprints.
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Table 2: Representative results for rank-indexed hashing under various parameter settings
(Po = 10−10, n = 105).
ε λ R L Z1 Z2 Z3 J2/B J3/B
1% 0.64 6 bits 60 45 8 45 17.9% 2.7%
0.1% 0.92 10 bits 64 63 17 50 36.0% 1.7%
0.01% 0.86 13 bits 61 59 13 48 23.3% 1.8%
In particular, the results presented are for false positive probabilities of ε = 1%, 0.1%, and
0.01%. Given the different parameter settings, we apply our tail bounds to optimize the
configurations to minimize storage cost. The derived configurations are in terms of the
load factor λ, the number of hash chain locations per bucket L, and the number of allocated
entries in the bucket and bucket extensions Z1, Z2, Z3.
For a configuration of these parameters, the amount of memory required is determined
as follows:
S1 = (L + Z1) + Z1r + (1 + blog J2c)
S2 = 1 + Z2 + Z2r + (1 + blog J3c)
S3 = 1 + Z3 + Z3r
S = BS1 + J2S2 + J3S3
Here, S1 is the storage requirement of one normal (first-level) bucket. The three additive
components correspond to the bitmap index, the fingerprints, and the pointer to bucket
extensions. (J2 is the number of pre-allocated second-level bucket extensions). S2 and
S3 are the size of the second-level and third-level bucket extensions. The one bit is for
indicating occupancy. Then the total memory cost S would be the sum of the storage
requirements for the B normal buckets, J2 second-level bucket extensions and J3 third-
level bucket extensions. Then the amortized storage cost per element can be computed as
S
n .
In Table 3 and Table 4, we compare results for the standard Bloom filter function [5]
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and for the counting Bloom filter function [22]. In addition to comparing with the standard
Bloom filter constructions, we also compare with a recently proposed fingerprint hash ta-
ble construction called d-left hashing [7, 6]. The standard Bloom filter functionality results
are shown in Table 3. In comparison to the d-left hashing construction, our rank-indexed
hashing results outperform it in storage cost by 23.2% to 29.5%. In comparison to the
standard Bloom filter construction, our rank-indexed hashing construction is able to out-
perform a standard Bloom filter construction in storage cost for false positive probabilities
at or below just 0.1%. This is significant since a standard Bloom filter construction is
widely regarded as a very space-efficient data structure for approximate membership query
problems, and it is often desirable to have a false positive probability smaller than 0.1% in
many applications.
Table 4 present the counting Bloom filter functionality results. In comparison to a
standard counting Bloom filter construction, our rank-indexed hashing construction is able
to outperform in storage cost by a factor of three for a false positive probability of just 1%,
and it is able to outperform the d-left hashing construction 22% to 27% at the same false
positive probabilities.
In table 5, we present another advantage of Rank-Indexed Bloom Filter, which could
save more space after “compression”. When used for transferring, there is no need to send
the vacant entries at the end of the higher index array and the fingerprint array in each
bucket. After removing all these vacant entries, the trimmed size is only S p = 1/λ + (r +
1) bits per item. It is sufficient to transfer these trimmed buckets without any additional
information, since the boundary of each array could be determined by counting the index
bitmaps. The trimmed size is smaller than the optimized standard Bloom Filter size. To
use Compressed Bloom Filter to achieve the same compression effect, much larger original
Bloom Filter size will be needed. In table 5, we could see that our Rank-Indexed scheme
could easily achieve very compact trimmed size, while a much larger original array is
needed for a Compressed Bloom Filter to achieve the same compression ratio.
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Table 3: Comparisons of storage cost (in bits) per element to achieve the same false posi-
tive probability ε for the standard Bloom filter function.
ε standard d-left Rank Comparison
vs. standard vs. d-left
1% 9.6 15.0 10.6 +10.1% −29.5%
0.1% 14.6 18.0 14.4 −1.1% −26.3%
0.01% 19.1 22.2 18.2 −4.4% −23.2%
Table 4: Comparisons of storage cost (in bits) per element to achieve the same false posi-
tive probability ε for the counting Bloom filter (CBF) function.
ε standard d-left Rank Comparison
CBF CBF CBF vs. standard vs. d-left
1% 38.3 17.6 13.0 −66% −27%
0.1% 58.4 22.3 16.8 −71% −24%
0.01% 76.3 26.4 20.6 −73% −22%
Since d-left Bloom Filter is also fingerprint hash-table based, it could also be “com-
pressed” similarly. However, its compression effect is much weaker, as also presented in
table 5.
Finally, storage cost comparisons are presented in Figure 5 and Figure 6 for false pos-
itive probabilities ranging from 10−1 to 10−7. As shown in these plots, the proposed rank-
indexing approach performs very competitively over this entire range.
2.6 Combination with d-left Hashing
As briefly introduced in Section 2.2.2, d-left hashing [63] is an efficient way to construct
Hash Table. It has been proposed to use d-left hashing to construct fingerprint-hash-table-
based Bloom Filter, called d-left Counting Bloom Filter [6]. However, in Section 2.2.2
we have provided a typical construction of d-left Bloom Filter and shown that it needs
considerable extra space. In this section, we will first generalize the analysis of memory
utilization of d-left Bloom Filter in Section 2.6.1, which will help readers to understand
the motivation of combining our rank-indexing with d-left Hashing. Then we will present
the Rank-Indexed d-left Bloom Filter in Section 2.6.2, and the evaluations of the combined
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Table 5: Comparison of transferring cost (in bits) per element against Compressed Bloom
Filter and d-left Bloom Filter
Packed Uncompressed Compression
ε Scheme Size Compression BF1 ratio2
1% Rank 8.6 30 89%
1% d-left 11.7 −−3 122%
0.1% Rank 12.1 150 83%
0.1% d-left 15.2 −−3 104%
0.01% Rank 15.2 1.3 × 103 79%
0.01% d-left 18.3 27 96%
1 “Uncompressed Compression BF” is the size of the uncompressed original array of a
Compressed Bloom Filter to achieve the same compression ratio.
2 “Compression ratio” is the ratio of the trimmed size of a Rank-Indexed or d-left scheme
vs. the size of an optimized standard Bloom Filter, under the same false positive rate.
3 Omitted since the trimmed size is still larger than the size of a corresponding optimized
standard Bloom Filter under the same false positive rate.
scheme in Section 2.6.3.
2.6.1 Analysis of Memory Utilization of d-left Bloom Filter
The typical construction of d-left Bloom Filter given in Section 2.2.2 and also in [6] is by 4
tables of buckets, 8 fingerprints per bucket and an average load of 6 fingerprints per bucket.
Suppose each fingerprint has x bits, the false positive probability would be:
ε = 4 × 6 × 2−x




In short, 86 (log2(1/ε) + log2(4 × 6)) bits of storage per inserted item would be needed
by this typical construction. Would other settings of parameters improve the efficiency
of storage? The paper [6] doesn’t provide any reason for selecting the parameters above.
However we could calculate by ourselves.
Suppose we have d tables, average load of m items per bucket , n items to be inserted







































Figure 5: Graphical plot of storage cost (in bits) per element to achieve the different false
positive probabilities ε for the standard Bloom filter function.
bucket overflow, since there is no backup mechanism for bucket overflow in d-left Bloom




)(log2(1/ε) + log2 md) (2)
Unfortunately, there hasn’t been found any way to provide a solid and precise statistical
guarantee for δ(d,m, n).
In [8] Broder et al provides a fluid-model based method to numerically approximately
calculate the overflow probability. The nature of the method is to use differentiate equations
to “simulate” the process of insertion and get the expected fraction of buckets that have

















































Figure 6: Graphical plot of storage cost (in bits) per element to achieve the different false
positive probabilities ε for the counting Bloom filter (CBF) function.
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with boundary conditions:
x0, j(t) = 1, for j = 1, ..., d
xk, j(0) = 0, for j = 1, ..., d; k > 0
The solution xi, j(t) would be the expected fraction of buckets in the jth table that have
at least i items , when Bt items have been inserted into a d-left hash table of B buckets in
each table.
We solve the equations above and summarize the results as the following: if we use
two choices (two tables), no matter how large m is, δ needs to be 4 to achieve an overflow
fraction lower than 10−20, i.e. we need 4 more entries per bucket to overcome fluctuation.
If we use three choices, δ is 3 . If we use four choices,δ is 2 . This result coincides with
Vocking’s asymptotical bound δ(d,m, n) = ln ln ndφd [63], where is asymptotically unrelated to
the particular value of m, which means buckets need almost the same size of extra space to
overcome fluctuations, when only the bucket size is different.
Intuitively, since δ(d,m, n) is almost a constant on m, it would benefit the memory
efficiency a lot if we enlarge the bucket size in d-left Bloom Filter. However, this intuition
is wrong.
In Figure 7, we summarize the relationship between the expected load per bucket and
the memory efficiency. We could observe that increasing bucket size from 8 items to 10
items could help a little bit and save around 0.5 bits per item, while still around 5 bits more
compared to the standard Bloom Filter (which is 11.5 bits per item for the false probability
of 0.4%). However, increasing the average load per bucket even more would help very
little. The reason is that, although large bucket would lead to relatively small extra space
per bucket, it would also increase the log2 md term in (2). In another word, larger bucket
size would not only increase the cost to access each fingerprint, but also contribute to more
false positives. Hence the 4-table-8-items-per-bucket design is almost the best for d-left
Bloom Filter. In one word, enlarging bucket size in d-left Bloom Filter could only improve
memory efficiency very little. For this reason, we resort to combining rank-indexing into
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Figure 7: memory savings through adjusting the size of bucket in d-left Bloom Filter, when
targeted false positive rate is 0.4%
d-left Bloom Filter.
2.6.2 Rank-Indexed d-left Bloom Filter
Although larger bucket might be a bad idea for a pure d-left Bloom Filter, rank-indexed
hashing would make some difference. The key idea of Rank-Indexed d-left Bloom Filter is
to use relatively larger bucket (say, 64) and then uses rank-indexing inside the bucket.
An illustration of Rank-Indexed d-left Bloom Filter is presented in Figure 8. Now we
have two tables. Each table has B buckets and hence 2B buckets in total. The structure
inside each bucket is the same as the rank-indexed bucket presented in Section 2.3. Thanks
to d-left hashing, here we no longer need the second and third level of bucket arrays since
the d-left hashing already guarantees a small overflow probability (although the guarantee
is theoretically less precise). Also thanks to rank-indexed hashing, we could have a larger















































Figure 8: An illustration of d-left Bloom Filter
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instead of four tables, which would reduce false positives and memory accesses.
The insertion and deletion procedures are multi-inherited from the original d-left Bloom
Filter and the original rank-indexed Bloom Filter. The procedure of selecting buckets to be
inserted or scanned is the same as the original d-left Bloom Filter, while the the operations
inside one bucket is the same as the original rank-indexed Bloom Filter.
The insertion procedure is as follows. For each element to be inserted, we still use a
single hash function H : U → [B] × [L] × [R] that hashes the element in S into three
parts H(x) = (b, `, r). Due to the d-left structure, we also need another random permutation
function H : [B] × [L] × [R] → [B] × [L] × [R] to map H(x) to another value Hp(H(x)) =
(bp, `p, rp). (please refer to [7] for the reason of this random permutation.) The next step
is to check two buckets, the bth bucket in the first table and bthp bucket in the second table,
and select the one with the least occupancy to be inserted in. If two buckets have the same
total number of fingerprints inserted, select the one in the first table. In the end, insert the
fingerprints into the `th (or `pth if the second table is selected) chain within the selected
bucket. The d-left hashing principle guarantees that the probability that the bucket has no
place to be inserted would be extremely small.
The query and deletion procedures are very similar, and hence omitted to save space.
2.6.3 Evaluation and Discussion of Rank-Indexed d-left Bloom Filter
According to the result calculated based on the procedures presented in [8] and summarized
in Section 2.6.1, if we plan to have x fingerprints on average in one bucket, we only need x+
4 pre-allocated locations of fingerprints. Hence we could have the following representative
results presented in Table 6. In those representative results, we choose to select the same Z
as L, since this would enhance memory alignment.
In Table 6, S1 denotes the number of bits per bucket, S/n denotes the average number
of bits needed per inserted item. Those two are calculated based on the following formulas.
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Table 6: Representative results for rank-indexed d-left hashing Bloom Filter .
ε λ r L Z λL S1 S/n
1.5% 0.94 6 bits 64 64 60 512 8.5
1.4% 0.88 6 bits 32 32 28 256 9.1
0.09% 0.94 10 bits 64 64 60 768 12.8
0.09% 0.88 10 bits 32 32 28 384 13.7
0.011% 0.94 13 bits 64 64 60 960 16
0.011% 0.88 13 bits 64 32 60 480 17.1
Table 7: Comparisons of storage cost (in bits) per element to achieve the same false posi-
tive probability ε for the standard Bloom filter function.
ε d-left Rank Ranked Comparison
d-left vs. d-left vs. rank
1.5% 14.2 9.8 8.5 -40% -11%
0.09% 19.6 15.5 12.8 -34% -17%
0.011% 23.6 19.2 16 -32% -17%
We also compare the results of the rank-indexed d-left Bloom Filter against to the orig-
inal rank-indexed hashing Bloom Filter and the original d-left hashing Bloom Filter in
Table 8 and Table 7.
We could see that, after combining both rank-indexed hashing and d-left hashing to-
gether, we could even greatly save the memory usage. However, we should keep in mind
that d-left hashing is saving memory cost in cost of less memory locality (lookup at least
two buckets instead of one) and increased amortized access cost.
Table 8: Comparisons of storage cost (in bits) per element to achieve the same false posi-
tive probability ε for the counting Bloom filter (CBF) function.
ε d-left Rank Ranked d-left Comparison
CBF CBF CBF vs. d-left vs. rank
1% 17.7 13.2 10.7 − 49 % − 19 %
0.09% 24.5 18.3 14.9 − 39% − 19 %
0.011% 29.5 23.0 18.1 − 39 % − 21 %
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2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have described a new fingerprint hash table construction that can achieve
the same functionalities as Bloom filters, counting Bloom filters, and other variants. The
construction is based on a new method called Rank-Indexed Hashing that can achieve very
compact representations. We have provided analysis and numerical evaluations to show
the storage performance of the proposed approach. In particular, a rank-indexed hashing
construction that offers the same functionality as a counting Bloom filter can be achieved
with a factor of three or more in space savings even for a false positive probability of just
1%. Even for a basic Bloom filter function that only supports membership queries, a rank-
indexed hashing construction requires less space for a false positive probability as high as
0.1%, which is significant since a standard Bloom filter construction is widely regarded as
extremely space-efficient for approximate membership problems.
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CHAPTER III
BRICK: RANK-INDEXING TECHNIQUE FOR EXACT ACTIVE
STATISTICS COUNTER ARRAY ARCHITECTURE
3.1 Problem Overview
It is widely accepted that network measurement is essential for the monitoring and con-
trol of large networks. For implementing various network measurement, router manage-
ment, and data streaming algorithms, there is often a need to maintain very large arrays
of statistics counters at wirespeeds (e.g., million counters for per-flow measurements). For
example, on a 40 Gb/s OC-768 link, a new packet can arrive every 8 ns and the correspond-
ing counter updates need to be completed within this time. While implementing large
counter arrays in SRAM can satisfy performance needs, the amount of SRAM required for
worst-case counter sizes is often both infeasible and impractical. Therefore, researchers
have actively sought alternative ways to realize large arrays of statistics counters at wire-
speeds [56, 53, 55, 70].
In particular, several SRAM-efficient designs of large counter arrays based on hybrid
SRAM/DRAM counter architectures have been proposed. Their baseline idea is to store
some lower order bits (e.g., 9 bits) of each counter in SRAM, and all its bits (e.g., 64 bits)
in DRAM. The increments are made only to these SRAM counters, and when the values of
SRAM counters become close to overflow, they will be scheduled to be “committed” back
to the corresponding DRAM counter. These schemes all significantly reduce the SRAM
cost. For example, the scheme by Zhao et al. [70] achieves the theoretically minimum
SRAM cost of between 4 to 6 bits per counter, when the speed difference between SRAM
and DRAM ranges between 10 (50ns/5ns) and 50 (100ns/2ns). However, in these schemes,
while writes can be done as fast as on-chip SRAM latencies (2 to 5ns), read accesses can
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only be done as slowly as DRAM latencies (e.g., 60 to 100ns). Therefore, such schemes
only solve the problem of so-called passive counters in which full counter values in general
do not need to be read out frequently (not until the end of a measurement epoch). Besides
the problem of slow reads, hybrid architectures also suffer from the problem of significantly
increasing the amount of traffic between SRAM (usually on-chip) and DRAM (usually
off-chip) across the system bus. This may become a serious concern in today’s network
processors, where system bus and DRAM bandwidth are already heavily utilized for other
packet processing functions [70].
While passive counters are good enough for many network monitoring applications,
a number of other applications require the maintenance of active counters, in which the
values of counters may need to be read out as frequently as they are incremented, typically
on a per packet basis. In many network data streaming algorithms [15, 21, 39, 40, 28, 67,
69], upon the arrival of each packet, values need to be read out from some counters to
decide on actions that need to be taken. For example, if Count-Min sketch [15] is used for
elephant detection, we need to read the counter values on a per packet basis because such
readings will decide whether a flow needs to be inserted into a priority queue (implemented
as a heap) that stores “candidate elephants”. A prior work on approximate active counters
[58] identifies several other data streaming algorithms that need to maintain active counters,
including multistage filters for elephant detection [21] and online hierarchical heavy hitter
identification [67]. Currently, all existing algorithms that use active counters implement
them as full-size SRAM counters. An efficient solution for exact active counters clearly
will save memory cost for all such applications.
3.1.1 Our approach and contributions
In this dissertation work, we propose the first solution to the open problem of how to
efficiently maintain exact active counters. Our objective is to design an exact counter array
scheme that allows for extremely fast read and write accesses (at on-chip SRAM speeds).
40
However, these goals will clearly push us back to the origins of using an array of full-size
counters in SRAM if we do not impose any additional constraint on the counter values. Fast
read access demands that the counters reside entirely in SRAM and we can make the values
of each counter large enough (and random enough) so that each of them needs the worst-
case (full-size) counter size. Therefore we will solve our problem under a very natural and
reasonable constraint. We assume that the total number of increments, which is exactly the
sum of counter values in the array, is bounded by a constant M during the measurement
interval.
This constraint is a reasonable constraint for several reasons. First, this constraint is
natural since the number of increments is bounded by the maximum packet arrival rate
times the length of the measurement epoch. We can easily enforce an overall count sum
limit by limiting the length of the measurement epoch. Moreover, this constraint has been
assumed in designing other memory-efficient data structures such as Spectral Bloom Fil-
ters [14]. Furthermore, our scheme will work for arbitrarily large M values, although its
relative memory savings compared to full-size counters get gradually lower with larger M
values.
Let N be the total number of counters in the array. Then the ratio MN corresponds to the
(worst-case) average value of a counter, which is indeed a more relevant parameter than
M for evaluation purposes, as it corresponds to the “per-counter workload”. We observe
that small MN ratio is dictated by many real-world applications. For example, if we use a




(e ≈ 2.718) counters each, for estimating the
sizes of TCP/UDP flows, then with probability at least 1 − δ, the CM-sketch overcounts (it
never under-counts) by at most Mε. Suppose we set δ to 0.1 and ε to 10−5 so that we use a
total of ln( 10.1 )×
e
10−5 ≈ 6.259×10
5 counters. When the total number of increments M is set
to 108 and correspondingly the average counts per counter MN is approximately 160, we can
guarantee that the error is no more than 1,000 (= 108×10−5) with probability at least 0.9.
However, 1,000 are considered very large errors and hence for practice we always want MN
41
Figure 9: BRICK wall (conceptual baseline scheme)
to be much smaller.
We emphasize that even when the ratio MN is small, it is still important to figure out ways
to save memory, as naive implementations can be grossly wasteful. For example, let the to-
tal counts be M = 16 million and the number of counters be N = 1 million. In other words,
the average counter value MN is 16. Since all increments can go to the same counter, fixed-
counter-size design would require a conservative counter size of lg(16 × 106) = 24 bits.
However, as we will show, our scheme can significantly reduce the SRAM requirement,
which is very important for ASIC implementations where SRAM cost is among the pri-
mary costs.
In this chapter, we present an exact active counter architecture called Bucketized (B)
Rank (R) Indexed (I) Counter (CK), or BRICK. It is built entirely in SRAM so that both
read and increment accesses can be processed at tens to hundreds of millions of packets per
second. In addition, since it is stored entirely in SRAM, it will not introduce traffic between
SRAM and DRAM. This makes it also a very attractive solution for passive counting appli-
cations in which the aforementioned problem of increased traffic over system bus caused
by the hybrid SRAM/DRAM architecture becomes a serious concern.
The basic idea of our scheme is intuitive and is based on a very familiar networking
concept: statistical multiplexing. Our idea is to bundle groups of a fixed number (let it
be 64 in this case) of counters, which is randomly selected from the array, into buckets.
We allocate just enough bits to each counter in the sense that if its current value is Ci, we
allocate blog2 Cic + 1 bits to it. Therefore, counters inside a bucket have variable widths.
Suppose the mean width of a counter averaged over the entire array is γ. By the law of
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large numbers, the total widths of counters in most of the buckets will be fairly close to
γ multiplied by the number of counters per bucket. Depicting each counter as a “brick”,
as shown in Figure 9, a section of the “brick wall” illustrates the effect of statistical multi-
plexing, where each horizontal layer of bricks (consisting of 64 of them) corresponds to a
bucket and the length of bricks corresponds to the real counter widths encoding flow sizes
in a real-world Internet packet trace (the USC trace in Section 3.6.2).
As we see in this figure, when we set the bucket size to be slightly longer than 64γ
(the vertical dashed line), the probability of the total widths of the bricks overflowing this
line is quite small; among the 20 buckets shown, only 1 of them has an overflow. Although
overflowed buckets need to be handled separately and will cost more memory, we can make
this probability small and the overall overflow cost is small and bounded. Therefore, our
memory consumption only needs to be slightly larger than 64γ per bucket.
This baseline approach is hard to implement in hardware in practice for two reasons.
First, we need to be able to randomly access (i.e., jump to) any counter with ease. Since
counters are of variable sizes, we still need to spend several bits per counter for the indexing
within the bucket. Note that being able to randomly access is different from being able
to delimit all these counters. The latter can be solved with by prefix-free coding (e.g.,
Huffman coding [16]) of the counter values. Those coding techniques would replace the
counter values with variable-length symbols, which could make the size of storage much
smaller while the overhead of accessing and modifying data much larger.
BRICK addresses these two difficulties with a little more overall SRAM cost. It allows
for very efficient read and expansion (for increments that increase the width of a counter
such as from 15 to 16). A key technique in our data structure is an indexing scheme
called rank indexing, borrowed from the compression techniques in [35, 18, 59, 33]. The
operations involved in reading and updating this data structure are not only simple for ASIC
implementations, but are also supported in modern processors through built-in instructions
such as “shift” and “popcount” so that software implementation is efficient (as the involved
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basic operations such as shift and popcount are supported by modern processors [1, 2]).
Therefore our scheme can be implemented efficiently both in hardware or software.
3.2 Background and Related works
In this section, we compare and contrast our work with previous approaches. One category
of approaches is based on the idea of a SRAM/DRAM hybrid architecture [56, 53, 55, 70].
The state of art scheme [70] only requires log2 µ bits per counter where µ is the speed
different between SRAM and DRAM. This translates into between 4 to 6 SRAM bits per
SRAM counter. However, the read can take quite long (say at least 100ns). Therefore,
these approaches only solve the passive counting problem.
Another category of approaches is existing active counter solutions [49, 17, 58], which
are all based on the approximate counting idea invented by Morris [49]. The idea is to
probabilistically increment a counter based on the current counter value. However, approx-
imate counting in general has a very large error margin when the number of bits used is
small because the possible estimation values are very sparsely distributed in the range of
possible counts. Therefore, when the counter values are small (say 5), its estimation can
have a very high relative error (well over 100%). This is not acceptable in network ac-
counting and data streaming applications where small counter values can be important for
overall measurement accuracy. In fact, when the (worst-case) average counter value MN is
no more than 128, the SRAM cost of our BRICK scheme (about 12 bits) is no more than
that of [58], which is approximate.
Recently, another counter architecture called counter braids [45] has been proposed,
which is inspired by the construction of LDPC codes [26] and can keep track of exact
counts of all flows without remembering the association between flows and counters. At
each packet arrival, counter increments can be performed quickly by hashing the flow label
to several counters and incrementing them. The counter values can be viewed as a linear
transformation of flow counts, where the transformation matrix is the result of hashing all
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flow labels during a measurement epoch. However, counter braids are not active and are in
fact “more passive” than the SRAM/DRAM hybrid architectures. To find out the size of a
single flow, one needs to decode all the flow counts through a fairly long iterative decoding
procedure. 1.
Finally, Spectral Bloom Filter [14] has been proposed, which provides an internal data
structure for storing variable width counters. It uses a hierarchical indexing structure to
locate counters that are packed next to each other, which allows for fast random accesses
(reads). However, an update that causes the width of the counter i to grow will cause a shift
to counters i + 1, i + 2, ..., which can have a global cascading effect even with some slack
bits provided in between, making it prohibitively expensive when there can be millions
of counters. As acknowledged in [14], although the expected amortized cost per update
remains constant, and the global cascading effect is small in the average case, the worst-
case cannot be tightly bounded. Therefore, SBF with variable width encoding is not an
active counter solution as it cannot ensure fast per-packet write accesses at every packet
arrival, forcing it to become a mostly-read-only data structure in the sense that updates
should be orders of magnitude less frequent than queries.
3.3 Design of BRICK
In this section, we describe the proposed BRICK counter architecture. The objective of
BRICK is to efficiently encode a set of N exact active counters C1, C2, . . ., CN , under
the constraint that throughout a network measurement epoch the total counts2 across all
counters
∑N
i=1 Ci is no more than a pre-determined threshold M, which is carefully justified
in Section 3.1. As we explained earlier, since all increments can go to the same counter,
the value of a counter can be as large as M, and hence the worst-case counter width is
L = blog2 Mc+ 1. However, it is unnecessarily expensive to allocate L bits to every counter
1In [45], they need 25 seconds on a 2.6GHz computer to decode the flow counts inside a 6-minute-long
traffic trace.
2Here with an abuse of notation, we will use Ci to denote both the counter and its current count (value).
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since only a tiny number of them will have counts large enough to require this worst-case
width while most others need significantly fewer bits. Therefore, BRICK adopts a sophis-
ticated variable width encoding of counters and can statistically multiplex these variable
width counters through a bucketing scheme to achieve a much more compact representa-
tion. However, unlike the aforementioned baseline bucketing scheme, BRICK is extremely
SRAM-efficient yet allows for very fast counter lookup and increment operations.
In the following, we will first present an overview of our proposed design in Sec-
tion 3.3.1, followed by how it handles lookups, increments, and bucket overflows in Sec-
tions 3.3.2 to 3.3.4, respectively.
3.3.1 Overview
The basic idea of BRICK is to randomly bundle N counters into h buckets, B1, B2, . . ., Bh,
where each bucket holds k counters (e.g. k = 64 in practice) and N = hk. In each bucket,
some counters will be long (possibly L bits in the worst-case) and some will be short, de-
pending on the values they contain. As discussed earlier, the objective of bundling is to
“statistically multiplex” the variable counter widths in a bucket so that each bucket only
needs to be allocated memory space that is slightly larger than k times the average counter
width (across N counters). Note that since we do not know the actual average width of a
counter in advance, we need to instead use the average width in the following adversar-
ial context. Imagine that an adversary chooses C1,C2, . . .CN values under the constraint∑N
i=1 Ci ≤ M that maximizes the metrics (e.g., average counter width). We emphasize that
such an adversary is defined entirely in the well-established context of randomized online
algorithm design [50] and has nothing to do with its connotation in security and cryptogra-
phy.
Fig. 10 depicts these ideas of randomization and bucketization. In particular, as de-
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:
(a) Index permutation (b) Bucketization
Figure 10: Randomly bundling counters into buckets.
{1. . .N} → {1. . .N} is first applied to the index y to obtain a permuted index i. This pseudo-
random permutation function in practice can be as simple3 as reversing the bits of y. The
corresponding counter Ci can then be found in the `th bucket B`, where ` = d ik e. The bucket
structure is depicted in Fig. 10(b). Unless otherwise noted, when we refer to the ith counter
Ci, we will assume i is already the result of a random permutation.
As we explained before, the baseline bucketing scheme does not allow for efficient read
and write (increment) accesses. In BRICK, a multi-level partitioning scheme is designed
to address this problem as follows. The worst-case counter width L is divided into p parts,
which we refer to as “sub-counters”. The jth sub-counter, j ∈ [1, p] (from the least signif-
icant bits to most significant bits) has w j bits, such that 0 < w j ≤ L and
∑p
j=1 w j = L. To
save space, for each counter, BRICK maintains just enough of its sub-counters to hold its
current value. In other words, counters with values no more than 2w1+w2+···+wi will not have
3Since the adversary is defined in the online algorithm context discussed above, we do not believe crypto-






























































































Figure 11: (a) Within a bucket, segmentation of variable-width counters into sub-counter
arrays. (b) Compact representation of variable-width counters. (c) Updated data structure
after incrementing C2.
its (i + 1)th, . . . , pth sub-counters stored in BRICK. For example, if w1 = 5, any counter
with value less than 25 = 32 will only be allocated a memory entry for its 1st sub-counter.
Consider the example shown in Fig. 11(a) with k = 8 counters in a bucket. Only C1 and
C5 require more than their first sub-counters. Such an on-demand allocation requires us to
link together all sub-counters of a counter, which we achieve using a simple and memory-
efficient bitmap indexing scheme called rank indexing. Rank indexing enables efficient
lookup as well as efficient expansion (when counter values exceed certain thresholds after
increments), which will be discussed in detail in Section 3.3.2.
Each bucket contains p sub-counter arrays A1, A2, . . ., Ap to store the 1st, 2nd, . . .,
pth sub-counters (as needed) of all k counters in the bucket. How many entries should be
allocated for each array Ai, denoted as ki, turns out to be a non-trivial statistical optimization
problem. On the one hand, to save memory, we would like to make k2, k3, . . ., kp (k1 is fixed
as k) as small as possible. On the other hand, when we encounter the unlucky situation that
we need to exceed any of these limits (say for a certain d, we have more than kd counters in
a bucket that have values larger than or equal to 2w1+w2+···+wi−1), then we will have a “bucket
overflow” that would require that all counters inside the bucket be relocated to an additional
array of full-size buckets with fixed worst-case width L for each counter, as we will show
in Section 3.3.4. Given the high cost of storing a duplicated bucket in the full-size array,
we would like to choose larger k2, . . . , kp to make this probability as small as possible.
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3.3.2 Rank Indexing
A key technique in our data structure is an indexing scheme that allows us to efficiently
identify the locations of the sub-counters across the different sub-counter arrays for some
counter Ci. In particular, for Ci, its d sub-counters Ci,1, . . . ,Ci,d are spread across A1, . . . , Ad
at locations ai,1, . . . , ai,d, respectively (i.e., Ci, j = A j[ai, j]). For example, as shown in
Fig. 11(b), C5 is spread across A3[1] = 10, A2[2] = 11, and A1[5] = 11011.
For each bucket, we maintain an index bitmap I. I is divided into p−1 parts, I1, . . . , Ip−1,
with an one-to-one correspondence to the sub-counter arrays A1, . . . , Ap−1, respectively.
Each part I j is a bitmap with k j bits, I j[1], . . . , I j[k j], one bit I j[a] for each entry A j[a] in
A j. Each I j[a] is used to determine if the counter stored in A j[a] has expanded beyond the
jth sub-counter array. I j is also used to compute the index location of Ci in the next sub-
counter array A j+1. Because a counter cannot expand beyond the last sub-counter array,
there is no need for an index bitmap component for the most significant sub-counter array
Ap. For example, consider the entries A1[1] and A1[5] where the corresponding counter has
expanded beyond A1. This is indicated by having the corresponding bit positions I1[1] and
I1[5] set to 1, as shown in shaded boxes in Fig. 11(b). All remaining bit positions in I1 are
set to 0, as shown in clear boxes.
For each counter that has expanded beyond A1, an arrow is shown in Fig. 11(b) that
links a sub-counter in A1 with the corresponding sub-counter entry in A2. For example,
for C5, its sub-counter entry A1[5] in A1 is linked to the sub-counter entry A2[2] in A2.
Rather than expending memory to store these links explicitly, which could vanish savings
gained by reduced counter widths, we dynamically compute the location of a sub-counter
in the next sub-counter array A j+1 based on the current bitmap I j. This way, no memory
space is needed to store link pointers. This dynamic computation can be readily determined
using an operation called rank(s, j), which returns the number of ones only in the range
s[1] . . . s[ j] in the bit-string s. This operation is similar to the rank operator defined in [35].
We apply the rank operator on a bitmap I j by interpreting it as a bit-string. As we
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shall see in Sections 3.4 and 3.6, our approach is designed to work with small buckets of
counters (e.g. k = 64). Therefore, the corresponding bit-strings I j are also relatively short
since all sub-counter arrays satisfy k j ≤ k. Moreover, each successive k j in the higher
sub-counter arrays is substantially smaller than the previous sub-counter array, with the
corresponding reduction in the length of the bit-string I j. In turn, the rank operator can be
efficiently implemented by combining a bitwise-AND instruction with another operation
called popcount(s), which returns the number of ones in the bit-string s. Fortunately, the
popcount operator is becoming an increasingly available hardware-optimized instruction
in modern microprocessors and network processors. For example, current generations of
64-bit x86 processors have this instruction built-in [1, 2]. Using this popcount instruction,
the rank operation for bit-strings with lengths up to |s| = 64 bits can be readily computed
in as few as two instructions. As shown with numerical examples and trace simulations in
Section 3.6, very good results can be achieved with a bucket size fixed at 64.
The pseudo-code for the lookup operation is shown in Algorithm 1. The retrieval of
the sub-counters using rank indexing is shown in Lines 3-6, with the final count returned
at the end of the procedure. For a hardware implementation, the iterative procedure can be
readily pipelined. As we shall see in Section 3.6, we only need a small number of levels
(e.g. three) in practice to achieve efficient results.
3.3.3 Handling Increments
The increment operation is also based on the traversal of sub-counters using rank index-
ing. We will first describe the basic idea by means of an example. Consider the counter C2
in Fig. 11(b). Its count is 31, which can be encoded in just the sub-counter array A1 with
C2,1 = 11111. Suppose we want to increment C2. We first increment its first sub-counter
component C2,1 = 11111, which results in C2,1 = 00000 with a carry propagation to the
next level. This is depicted in Fig. 11(c).




Ci = 0; a = i mod k;2
for j = 1 to p3
Ci, j = A j[a];4
if ( j == p or I j[a] == 0) break;5
a = rank(I j, a);6
return Ci;7
increment(i)8
a = i mod k;9
for j = 1 to p10
A j[a] = A j[a] + 1;11
if ( j == p or A j[a] , 0) break; /* last array or no carry */12
if (I j[a] == 1) /* next level already allocated */13
a = rank(I j, a);14
else /* expand */15
I j[a] = 1;16
a = rank(I j, a);17
b = (a − 1)w j+1 + 1;18
A j+1 = varshift(A j+1, b,w j+1);19
I j+1 = varshift(I j+1, a, 1);20
A j+1[a] = 1;21
break;22
The location of C2,2 can be determined using rank indexing (i.e. rank(I1, 2) = 2). How-
ever, the location of A2[2] was previously occupied by the counter C5. To maintain rank
ordering, we have to shift the entries in A2 down by one to free up the location A2[2]. This
is achieved by applying an operation called varshift(s, j, c), which performs a right shift
on the sub-string starting at bit-position j by c bits (with vacant bits filled by zeros). The
varshift operator can be readily implemented in most processors by means of shift and
bitwise-logical instructions.
In particular, we can view a sub-counter array A j as a bit-string formed by the con-
catenation of its entries, namely A j = A j[1]A j[2] . . . A j[k j]. The starting bit-position for an
entry A j[a] in the bit-string can be computed as b = (a−1)w j + 1, where w j is the bit-width
of the sub-counter array A j. Consider C5 in Fig. 11(c). After the shifting operation has been
applied, the location of its sub-count in A2 will be shifted down by one entry. Therefore,
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its corresponding expansion status in I2 must be shifted down by one position as well. The
carry propagation of C2 into A2 is achieved by setting A2[2] = 1.
As with the rank operator, BRICK has been designed to work with small fixed size
buckets so that varshift can be directly implemented using hardware-optimized instruc-
tions. In particular, varshift only has to operate on A2 or higher. Since the size of
each level decreases exponentially, the bit-strings formed by each sub-counter array A2 and
above are also very short. As the results show in Section 3.6, with a bucket size of 64,
all sub-counter arrays A2 and above have a string length at most 64 bits, much less for the
higher levels. Therefore, varshift can be directly implemented using 64 bit instructions.
The pseudo-code for the increment operation is shown in the latter part of Algo-
rithm 1. Again, the iterative procedure shown in Algorithm 1 for increment is readily
amenable to pipelining in hardware. In general, the lookup or update of each successive
level of sub-counter arrays can be pipelined such that at each packet arrival, a lookup or
update can operate on A1 while a previous operation operates on A2, and so forth.
3.3.4 Handling Overflows
Thus far, we have assumed in our basic data structure that we are guaranteed that each
sub-counter array has been dimensioned to always provide sufficient entries to store all
sub-counters in a bucket. To achieve greater memory efficiency, the number of entries
in the sub-counter arrays can be reduced so that there is only a very small probability
that a bucket will not have sufficient sub-counter array entries. As rigorously analyzed in
Section 3.4 and numerically evaluated in Section 3.6, this bucket overflow probability can
be made arbitrarily small while achieving significant reduction in storage for each bucket.
To facilitate this overflow handling, we extend the basic data structure described in Sec-
tion 3.1 with a small number of full-size buckets F1, F2, . . . , FJ. Each full-size bucket Ft is
organized as k full-size counters (i.e., all counters with a worst-case width of L bits). When
a bucket overflow occurs for some B`, the next available full-size bucket Ft is allocated to
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store its k counters, where t is just +1 of the last allocated full-size bucket. An overflow
status flag f` is set to indicate the bucket has overflowed. The index of the full-size bucket
Ft is stored in a field labeled t`, which is associated with B`. In practice, we only need a
small number of full-size buckets. As shown in Section 3.6, for real Internet traces with
over a million counters, only about J ≈ 100 full-size buckets are enough to handle the
overflow cases. Therefore, the index field only requires a small number of extra bits per
bucket (e.g. 7 bits).
Rather than migrating all k counters from B` to Ft` at once, a counter is only migrated
on-demand upon the next increment operation (“migrate-on-write”). This way, the migra-
tion of an overflow counter to a full-size counter does not disrupt other counter updates.
The location of counter Ci in Ft` is simply a = i mod k, as before. To indicate if counter
Ci has been migrated, a migration status flag gt`[a] is associated with each counter entry
Ft`[a] (i.e. gt`[a] = 1 indicates that the corresponding counter has been migrated).
The modified lookup operation simply first checks if a counter from an overflowed
bucket has already been migrated, in which case the full-size count is simply retrieved from
corresponding full-size bucket entry. Otherwise, the counter is retrieved as before. The
modified increment operation is extended in a similar manner. It first checks if a counter
from an overflowed bucket has already been migrated, in which case the full-size counter
in the corresponding full-size bucket is incremented. If the counter is from a previously
overflowed bucket B`, but it has not been migrated yet, then it is read from B`, incremented,
and migrated-on-write to the corresponding location in the full-size bucket. Otherwise, the
counter in B` is incremented as before. Finally, before propagating a carry to the next level,
we first check if all entries in the next sub-counter array are already being used. If so,





In this section, we bound the failure probability P f that the number of overflowed buckets,
each of which carries the hefty penalty of having to be allocated an additional bucket of
full-size counters (as discussed in Section 3.3.4), will exceed any given threshold J. We
will establish a rigorous relationship between P f and parameters k2, k3, ..., kp the number
of entries BRICK allocates to sub-counter arrays A2, ..., Ap (The size of A1 is already fixed
to k) and w1, w2, ..., wp, the widths of an entry in A2, ..., Ap. The ultimate objective of this
analysis is to find the optimal tradeoff between k2, k3, ..., kp and J that allows us to minimize
the amount of overall memory consumption (h = N/k regular buckets + J full-size buckets)
while keeping the failure probability P f under an acceptable threshold (say 10−10 or even
smaller). Surprisingly, the theory of stochastic ordering [51], which seems unrelated to the
context of this work, plays a major role in these derivations.
Recall that the maximum counter width L is partitioned into sub-counter widths w1, w2,
..., wp. Only counters whose value is larger than or equal to 2Ld , where Ld is defined as∑d−1
j=1 w j, will need an entry in the sub-counter array Ad of a bucket. Since the aggregate
count of all counters is no more than M, we know that there will be at most md of such
counters in the whole counter array, where md is defined as M2−Ld .
Now imagine at most md such counters are uniformly randomly distributed into N array
locations through the aforementioned index permutation scheme. We hope that they are
very evenly distributed among these buckets so that very few buckets will have more than
kd of them falling into it (i.e., overflow of Ad). Suppose we dimension Jd full-size buckets to
handle bucket overflows caused by these counters. We would like to bound the probability
that more than Jd buckets will have their Ad arrays overflowed.
We will consider the worst case scenario that there are exactly md counters needing
entries in Ad. If there are less such counters, the overflow probability will only be smaller,
and our tail bound still applies. For convenience, we denote the percentage of them in the
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counter array mdN as αd.
Let random variables X1,d, X2,d, ..., Xh,d be the number of used entries in the sub-counter
array Ad among the buckets B1, B2, ..., Bh. Each array location has a probability αd of being
assigned one of the md counters, and there are k array locations in each bucket, so X j,d is
roughly distributed as Binomial(k, αd) for any j. Here Binomial(N ,P) is the Binomial
distribution with N trials and P as the success probability of each trial. Therefore, the
overflow probability of level d from any bucket B j is roughly
εd = Binotailk,αd (kd)







Pz(1 − P)(N−z) denotes the tail probability Pr[Z > K],
where Z has distribution Binomial(N ,P).
Intuitively, these random variables are almost independent, as the only dependence
among them seems to be that their total is md. If we do assume that they are indepen-
dent, then the probability that the number of total overflows be larger than Jd entries is
roughly
δd = Binotailh,εd (Jd)
Readers understandably will immediately protest this voodoo tail bound result since the
X j,d’s are not exactly Binomial, and they are not actually independent. Interestingly, we are
able to establish a rigorous tail bound of 2δd, which is only two times the voodoo tail bound
δd. A similar bound has been established by Mitzenmacher and Upfal in their book [48]
which used independent Poisson distributions to bound multinomial distributions, using
techniques from stochastic ordering theory [51] implicitly (i.e., without introducing such
concepts). In our case we use independent binomial distributions to bound multivariate
hypergeometric distributions, i.e. those of X1,d, X2,d, ..., Xh,d.
Based on this rigorous tail bound to be proven in Section 3.4.2 and taking union of the
overflow events from all the subarrays, we arrive at the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Let parameters δ2, · · · , δp be defined as above. The failure probability of
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insufficient full-size buckets, i.e. that the total number of overflows that need to be moved
to the additional full-size buckets from all subarrays exceeds J = J2 + · · · + Jp, is no more
than 2(δ2 + · · · + δp).
If given a target worst-case failure probability P f of insufficient full-size buckets, e.g.
10−10 or even smaller, an optimization procedure remains to configure parameters from
w1 to wp−1, k2 to kp, and J2 to Jp, so that we can achieve the best tradeoff for the overall
memory space, which takes into consideration the storage of all sub-counter arrays, index
bitmaps, and all full-size buckets, and even the blg(J)c + 2 bits for f` and t` in each bucket,
which indicate the migration to full-size buckets.
Given the messy nature of the Binomial distribution, “clean” analytical solutions (e.g.,
based on Lagrange multipliers) do not exist. We designed a quick search strategy that can
generate near-optimal configurations. Our evaluation results in Sec 3.6 are obtained based
on the near-optimal parameter configurations generated by this procedure. We omit the
detail of this procedure in the interest of space.
3.4.2 the Main Tail Bound
In this section, we state formally the aforementioned tail bound theorem (two times the
voodoo bound). We would like to state this theorem using generic parameters that have the
same symbol as before but without the subscript d, since they can be replaced by the corre-
sponding parameters with subscript d to obtain the tail bound on the number of overflows
from every subarray Ad. In particular, we will replace md (the number of counters that will
have an entry in sub-counter array Ad) by m, and kd (the number of entries in sub-counter
array Ad) by c, as k has been used to denote the number of counters in each bucket in the
original counter array. Furthermore, to highlight the general nature of our theorem, we
further detach ourselves from the application semantics by stating the theorem as follows.
Theorem 2. m balls are uniformly randomly thrown into h buckets that has k entries each,
with at most one ball in each entry. Let N = hk. Let X(m)1 , ..., X
(m)
h be the number of balls
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that falls into each bucket. Let α = mhk and assume α ≤
1
2 . Let Y
(α)
1 , ..., Y
(α)
h be independent
random variables distributed as Binomial(k, α). Let f (x1, ..., xh) be an increasing function
in each argument. Then
E[ f (X(m)1 , ..., X
(m)





Before we prove this theorem, we need to formally characterize the underlying prob-
ability model and in particular specify precisely what we mean by throwing m balls “uni-





ways of injective mapping from
m balls into N entries, every way happens with equal probability 1(Nm)
, when these balls are
considered indistinguishable. We refer to this characterization of the underlying probabil-
ity model as “throwing m balls into N entries in one shot”. It is not hard to verify that
the following process of “throwing m balls into N entries one by one” results in the same
probability model. In this process, at first a ball is thrown into an entry chosen uniformly
from these N entries. Then another ball is thrown into an entry uniformly picked from the
remaining N−1 entries, and so on. This equivalent characterization of the underlying prob-
ability model makes it easier for us to establish the stochastic ordering relationship among
vectors of random variables in Section 3.4.3, an essential step for the proof of Theorem 2.
Now we are ready to prove Theorem 1.
Proof of Theorem 1. We use X(l)1 , X
(l)
2 , . . . , X
(l)
h when there are l balls thrown instead of
m. In Proposition 3, we prove that for any l value, µ(X(l)1 , X
(l)
2 , . . . , X
(l)
h ) is equivalent to
µ(Y (α)1 ,Y
(α)






j = l), where µ(Z) denotes the distribution of a random vari-




j = l, the independent random
variables Y (α)1 ,Y
(α)
2 , . . . ,Y
(α)
h have the same joint distribution as dependent random variables
X(l)1 , X
(l)
2 , . . . , X
(l)
h . Then we prove in Proposition 5 that, when l ≤ l
′, [X(l)1 , X
(l)
2 , . . . , X
(l)
h ] is




2 , . . . , X
(l′)
h ]. For any increasing
function f (x1, x2, ..., xh), we have
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Y (α)j = l] (4)





Y (α)j ≥ m]
= E[ f (X(m)1 , · · · , X
(m)




E[ f (X(m)1 , ..., X
(m)
h )] (5)
Equality (3) is due to Proposition 3, inequality (4) is due to Proposition 3, and inequality
(5) is due to the properties of the 50-percentile point of Binomial distributions proven in
[27]. 
Corollary 2. Let the variable be as defined in Theorem 2. Let c and J be some constants.






> J] ≤ 2Binotailh,ε(J)
Proof. Consider function f (x1, x2, · · · , xh) ≡ 1{∑hj=1 1{x j>c}>J}, which is an increasing func-
tion of x1, ..., xh. From Theorem 2 we have Pr[
∑h
j=1 1{X(m)j >c} > J] ≤ 2 Pr[
∑h
j=1 1{Y (α)j >C} >
J]. Since {1
{Y (α)j >c}
}1≤ j≤h are independent Bernoulli random variables with probability ε =
Binotailk,α(c), their sum is distributed as Binomial(h, ε). Therefore Pr[
∑h
j=1 1{Y j>c} > J] is
equal to Binotailh,ε(J). 
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Y (α)j = l) (6)
Proof. It suffices to prove that for any nonnegative integers l1, l2, ..., lh that satisfy
∑h
j=1 l j =
l, Pr[X(l)1 = l1, X
(l)
2 = l2, . . . , X
(l)
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ways of selecting l entries out of a total of N entries, and each way
happens with equal probability 1(Nl )













ways among them that result in the event {X(l)1 = l1, X
(l)
2 = l2, . . . , X
(l)=lh
h }. Now we prove that
the RHS is equal to (7) as well. Since Y (α)1 , Y
(α)
2 , . . ., Y
(α)
h are independent random variables


















j = l, we have
Pr[Y (α)1 = l1,Y
(α)





















Combining (8) and (9) we obtain that the RHS is equal to (7) as well. 
Stochastic ordering is a way to compare two random variables. Random variable X is
stochastically less than or equal to random variable Y , written X ≤st Y , iff Eφ(X) ≤ Eφ(Y)
for all increasing functions φ such that the expectations exits. An equivalent definition of
X ≤st Y is that Pr[X > t] ≤ Pr[Y > t],−∞ < t < ∞. The definition involving increasing
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functions also applies to random vectors X = (X1, ..., Xh) and Y = (Y1, ...,Yh): X ≤st Y
iff Eφ(X) ≤ Eφ(Y) for all increasing functions φ such that the expectations exits. Here φ
is increasing means that it is increasing in each argument separately with other arguments
being fixed. This is equivalent to φ(X) ≤st φ(Y). Note this definition is a much stronger
condition than Pr[X1 > t1, ..., Xh > th] ≤ Pr[Y1 > t1, ...,Yh > th] for all t = (t1, ..., th) ∈ Rn.
Now we state without proof a fact that will be used to prove Proposition 5. Its proof
can be found in all books that deal with stochastic ordering [51].
Proposition 4. Let X and Y be two random variables (or vectors). X ≤st Y iff there exists
X′ and Y ′ such that µ(X′) = µ(X), µ(Y ′) = µ(Y), and Pr[X′ ≤ Y ′] = 1.
Now we are ready to prove the following proposition.
Proposition 5. For any 0 ≤ l < l′ ≤ N, we have
[X(l)1 , X
(l)
2 , . . . , X
(l)




2 , . . . , X
(l′)
h ] (10)
Proof. It suffices to prove it for l′ = l + 1. Our idea is to find random variables Z and W
such that Z has the same distribution as [X(l)1 , X
(l)
2 , . . . , X
(l)
h ], W has the same distribution as
[X(l+1)1 , X
(l+1)
2 , . . . , X
(l+1)
h ], and Pr[Z ≤ W] = 1. We will use the aforementioned probability
model that is generated by “throwing m balls into N entries one-by-one” random process.
Now given any outcome ω in the probability space Ω, let Z(ω) = [Z1(ω),Z2(ω), ...,Zh(ω)],
where Z j(ω) is the number of balls in the jth bucket after we throw l balls into these N entries
one by one. Now with all these l balls there, we throw the (l + 1)th ball uniformly randomly
into one of the remaining empty entries. We define W(ω) as [W1(ω),W2(ω), ...,Wh(ω)],
where W j(ω) is the number of balls in the jth bucket after we throw in the (l + 1)th ball.
Clearly we have Z(ω) ≤ W(ω) for any ω ∈ Ω and therefore Pr[Z ≤ W] = 1. Finally, we
know from the property of the “throwing m balls into N entries one-by-one” random process
that Z and W have the same distribution as [X(l)1 , X
(l)
2 , . . . , X
(l)









3.5 Information theory bound
We are interested in how far we are from the optimal memory usage cost. In this section,
we will try to answer this question partly by deriving several lower bounds on the mini-
mum memory requirement per counter under the aforementioned constraint that the sum of
counter values C1, C2, ..., CN (i.e., the total number of increments) is no more than M.
We will explore this question in the following sequence. Firstly, we will present a naive
bound, which is the worst-case total number of bits needed to store all these counter values.
However, this bound doesn’t take into account the indexing cost. Therefore, secondly, we
will explore the additional indexing cost based on information theory. However, this part
is only aimed at getting a feeling about how much additional indexing cost is required,
since the derivation is not strict. Finally, we will analyze and prove the minimum number
of bits needed to accurately represent the whole counter array, no matter what kind of
coding/decoding techniques are used.
3.5.1 The worst-case average binary length of counters
When no coding techniques are used, every counter value is stored as a plain binary number.
The minimum memory required are the worst-case total number of bits of those counter
values.
For each counter value Ci, its binary length is blog2 Cic+1, where we use the convention
log2(0) = 0. Hence the worst-case bound of the average
4 number of bits per counter,











blog2 Cic + 1
N
.
It could be bounded through the Jensen’s inequality:
4For the convenience of comparison, we calculate and compare the average number of bits per counter


















Ci) + 1 = log2(M/N) + 1
If log2
M
N is an integer, all the inequalities above would hold when all counter values are





N is not an integer, it becomes a little more complex to get the precise value





subject to ∀i, βi ≥ 0;
∑L
i=1
βi = 1 (11)
M/N + 1 ≤
∑L
i=1
βi2i ≤ 2M/N (12)
where βi is the fraction of i-bit-long counters among all counters, i.e. 1N
∑N
j=1 1blog2 C jc=i−1, L
is the maximum possible length of one counter, i.e. blog2 Mc + 1. The constraints (12) are
transformed from the constraint
∑N
i=1 Ci = M, since for each Ci that is j-bit-long, 2
j−1 ≤
Ci ≤ 2 j − 1.
We could numerically solve the linear programming above, and could find that the
bound B0 is at least log2
M
N + 0.9 for arbitrary
M
N .
3.5.2 Bound1: Considering the unavoidable indexing costs
The lower bound above does not account for the extra bits needed to delimit these counter
values. However, it is hard to directly get the lower bound of indexing cost since we would
never know whether we have invented the most efficient indexing scheme and how far it is
from the optimal cost. We can only approximately estimate the cost through information
entropy.
Given an array of indistinguishable counter bits, the original counter values could be
decoded if and only if the sequence of the sizes of the counters are known. Hence we could
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Table 9: Bounds for schemes without using any coding technique
log2(
M
N )= 2 4 6 8
B0 =log2
M
N + 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Bindex = 1.83 2.61 3.10 3.45
B1 =log2
M
N + 1.82 1.94 1.96 1.97
model the worst-case indexing cost by calculating the worst-case information entropy of







However, we should notice that the counter size distribution {β1, β2, . . .} for the worst-
case indexing cost may not be the same as the distribution for the worst-case counter bits.
Hence if we want a more reasonable bound, it should be the result of the following opti-










Both two bounds could solved by standard Lagrange techniques. The numerical result
of B0, Bindex and B1 are presented in Table 9. Although the worst-case indexing cost Bindex
could be very large, only bound B0 and B1 are comparable with our scheme. Compared
with numbers in Table 11, our schemes are about 3 to 4 bits from the optimal cost that one
could achieve without compressing the original counter bits.
3.5.3 Bound2: Lower bound when optimal coding is used
Although we haven’t seen any works that could use coding techniques and support router-
level fast random read and write at the same time, we are still interested in the optimal
memory cost if we allow coding techniques. In our previous publication [32] published in
ANCS’08 , we calculate the worst-case 2-D empirical information entropy of the whole
counter array and claim that it is the worst-case bound for the case when optimal coding is
used. However, the method employed by [32] suffers the similar weakness as B1 and hence
not strict.
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Table 10: Information-theoretic lower bound.
log2(
M
N )= 2 4 6 8
B2 =log2
M
N + 1.61 1.49 1.45 1.45
We propose the following method to calculate a strict worst-case bound. Our constraint∑N
i=1 Ci ≤ M is equivalent to
∑N
i=1 Ci + δ = M, where δ is a non-negative integer. Basic
combinatorics gives that the number of distinct non-negative integer vectors {C1, ...,CN , δ}
satisfying
∑N





. Since each possible counter value vector must





bits of memory are needed to
accurately represent all possible counter value vectors, no matter what coding technique






/N. This lower bound is also achievable in theory, since we can index all possible





and simply store the index as a binary number.




















The numerical values of B2 is presented in Table 10. Interestingly, the results are very
close to the worst-case empirical entropy results in [32], with differences less than 1×10−4.
We observe that the worst-case bound B2, which allows coding techniques to be used
on counter values, would be smaller than B1 by around 0.2 to 0.5 bits. Hence we could
conclude that we are only 4 to 6 bits away from the optimal cost we could get even if
optimal coding is used.
We should notice that in reality we will never be even close to the bounds above, even
the bound B1, because the information theory employed in all those calculations does not
take account of the complexity issues, considering our application scenarios requires en-
coding and decoding (write and read) to be both very fast.
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3.6 Performance Evaluations
In this section, we will evaluate the performance of BRICK and show that BRICK is
extremely memory-efficient. Our results show that the number of extra bits needed per
counter in addition to the lower bounds log2
M
N remains practically constant with increasing
number of flows N, and hence the solution is scalable. We also evaluate in Section 3.6.2
the performance of our architecture using two real-world Internet traffic traces. Finally, we
discuss implementation issues in Section 3.7.
3.6.1 Numerical Results of Analytical Bounds
In this section, we present a set of numerical results computed from the tail bound theorems
derived in Section 3.4.
3.6.1.1 Configuration of Parameters and Memory Costs Optimization
Recall that in our problem, the number of flows N and the maximum total increments in
a measurement period M are given. For the specified N and M, we apply our tail bound
theorems to derive optimal configurations for different combinations of constraints, i.e.,
bucket sizes k, number of levels p, and failure probabilities P f . The derived configuration
is in terms of the number of entries in each sub-counter array k j, the width of each sub-
counter array w j, and the number of full-size buckets J that we need to ensure a failure
probability less than P f (the probability that we have insufficient entries in a sub-counter
array or a full-size bucket).
For a configuration of these parameters, the amount of memory required, which is also





k j(w j + 1)
 − kp





 + Jk (L + 1) (14)
Here S` is the memory cost of each bucket; its first component corresponds to the space
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required for storing the sub-counter arrays and the index bitmaps, and its second component
corresponds to the overflow status flag and the index to the corresponding full-size bucket5.
Then the total memory cost S is h = dNk e buckets of size S` each plus J full-size buckets
of size k(L + 1) each. (For each full-size counter of size L, we need 1 bit for indicating the
migration status.)
We traverse typical possible configurations with the help of branch-and-prune technique
and select the best among those configurations. We should emphasize that, actually there
might exist many different configurations around the optimal point. The difference between
the average memory utilization of those quasi-optimal points is very minute. In practice, it
is not necessary to really find the “optimal” point as long as the solution found is close to
the optimal enough. Hence the results shown below are only of typical example and might
not be the best.
3.6.1.2 Numerical results with various configurations
In Section 3.5, we have noticed that all lower bounds are just around one or two bits over
log2
M
N . Hence, for convenience, we use σ = (S/N) − log2(M/N)as a metric to evaluate the
space efficiency of our solution.
In Table 11, we first consider results for the case with k = 64 counters per bucket. We
first consider this case with a small bucket size to ensure that all string operations are within
64 bits, which allows for direct implementations using 64-bit instructions in modern pro-
cessors [1, 2]. As we shall see, substantial statistical multiplexing can already be achieved
with k = 64. For the results presented in Table 11, we used representative parameters with
N = 1 million counters and M = 16 million as the maximum total increments during a
measurement period. We also set the failure probability to be P f = 10−10, which is a tiny
probability corresponding to an average of one failure (when there are more than J over-
flowed buckets) every ten thousand years. We will later show in Figures 13, 14, and 15 that
5Since there are J full-size buckets, this index can be stored in blog2 Jc + 1 bits.
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Table 11: An Example of Sub-counter array sizing and per-counter storage for k = 64 and
P f = 10−10.
(a) Sizing of sub-counter arrays.
p k2 k3 k4 k5 w1 w2 w3 w4 w5
3 15 3 log2
M
N + 3 4 13
4 25 10 2 log2
M
N + 2 2 4 12
5 25 10 3 1 log2
M
N + 2 2 3 4 9
(b) Size of each sub-counter array = k j × w j (in bits).
p A2 A3 A4 A5
3 15 × 4 = 60 3 × 13 = 39
4 25 × 2 = 50 10 × 4 = 40 2 × 12 = 24
5 25 × 2 = 50 10 × 3 = 30 3 × 4 = 12 1 × 9 = 9
(c) Storage per counter.
p = 3 p = 4 p = 5
log2
M
N + 6.05 log2
M
N + 5.66 log2
M
N + 5.50
the additional per-counter storage cost beyond the minimum width of the average count is
practically a constant unrelated to the number of flows N, the maximum total increments
M, or the failure probability P f .
In Table 11(a), the number of entries and the width for each sub-counter array are
shown for BRICK implementations with varying number of levels p. As can be seen, in
each design, the number of entries decreases exponentially as we go to the higher sub-
counter arrays. This is the main source of our compression. With k = 64, the rank indexing
operation described in Section 3.3 only needs to be performed on bitmaps with |I j| ≤ 64 bits
(much less than 64 for the higher sub-counter arrays) and can be directly implemented using
64-bit popcount and bitwise-logical instructions that are available in modern processors [1,
2]. Table 11(b) shows the size of each sub-counter array. For all three designs, the space
requirement for each sub-counter array other than A1 is also less than 64 bits. Therefore,
the “varshift” operator described in Section 3.3.3, which only needs to operate on A2 and
higher, can be directly implemented using 64-bit shift and bitwise-logical instructions as
well.




























Figure 12: Impact of increasing bucket size k. Extra bits σ in the range of [5.03, 6.05].
levels, the extra storage cost per counter is 6.05, and the extra storage costs per counter
are 5.66 and 5.50 for four and five levels, respectively. The amount of extra storage only
decreases slightly with additional levels in the BRICK implementation. For example, as
we go from three to five levels, the reduction of 6.05 − 5.50 = 0.55 extra bits is only about
5.5% in the overall per-counter cost if log2
M
N = 4.
We next consider the impact of larger bucket sizes on storage costs. Figure 12 shows
the results for k = 128, 256, and 512. The number of extra bits per counter decreases
with increasing bucket sizes and number of levels, with σ in the range of [5.03, 6.05]. The
results show that increasing the bucket size has only an insignificant impact on the stor-
age savings, corresponding to only a small increase in statistical multiplexing with larger
buckets. Therefore, we will use 64 counters per bucket for software implementation and
recommend it for ASIC implementation as well, since it has the advantage that operations
can be directly implemented using 64-bit processor instructions in software.
As stated earlier, the added per-counter cost is practically a constant with respect to the
number of flows N, the maximum total increments M, and the failure probability P f . We



























number of flows (N)
Figure 13: Impact of in-
creasing number of flows N.
Extra bits σ in the range of
[5.65, 5.78].



















Figure 14: Impact of in-
creasing log2
M
N . Extra bits σ
































Figure 15: Impact of de-
creasing failure probability
P f . Extra bits σ in the range
of [5.65, 5.70].
are shown in Figures 13, 14, and 15, respectively. In these evaluations, we used 64 counters
per bucket and four levels.
In Figures 13, 14, and 15 we evaluate the impact of different N, M, and P f , where we
use k = 64 and p = 4.
Figure 13 shows that the added per-counter cost remains practically constant as we in-
crease N exponentially by powers of 10. Similarly, Figure 14 shows that the added cost
also remains practically constant with different ratios of M and N. These results show that
BRICK is scalable to different values of M and N with per-counter storage cost within
approximately a constant factor from the minimum width of the average count. Figure 15
shows the impact of decreasing failure probability. We show results for P f = 10−10 down
to 10−20. Again, we see that the change in storage cost is negligible with decreasing failure
probability, which means BRICK can be optimized to vanishingly small failure probabili-
ties with virtually no impact on storage cost.
3.6.2 Results for real Internet traces
In this section, we evaluate our active counter architecture using real-world Internet traffic
traces. The traces that we used were collected at different locations in the Internet, namely
University of Southern California (USC) and University of North Carolina (UNC), respec-
tively. The trace from USC was collected at their Los Nettos tracing facility on February
2, 2004, and the trace from UNC was collected on a 1 Gbps access link connecting the
campus to the rest of the Internet on April 24, 2003. For each trace, we used a 10-minute
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segment, corresponding to a measurement epoch. The trace segment from USC has 18.9
million packets and around 1.1 million flows; the trace segment from UNC has 32.6 million
packets and around 1.24 million flows. We use the first counter for the first encountered
flow in the trace, the second counter for the second encountered flow in the trace, etc.
We use the same general parameter settings as the evaluations in Section 3.5 with 64
counters per bucket, four levels, and a failure probability of P f = 10−10. The total storage
space required for counting packets 6 in USC trace is 1.36 MB, and the total required for the
UNC trace is 1.61 MB. In comparison, a naive implementation would require a worst-case
counter width for all counters. Both traces require a worst-case width of 25 bits, whereas
the BRICK implementations require a per-counter cost of about 10 bits. The total storage
required for a naive implementation is 3.85 MB for the USC trace and 4.40 MB for the
UNC trace. The BRICK implementations represent a 2.5x improvement in both cases.
This is exciting since with the same amount of memory, we will be able to squeeze in 2.5
times more counters, which is badly needed in future faster and “more crowded” Internet!
Table 12: Percentage of full-size buckets.
Trace h J Jh J
∗ J∗∗
USC 17.3K 112 0.65% 99 0
UNC 19.5K 127 0.65% 172 0
Table 12 shows the number of full-size buckets needed according to our tail bounds,
and the number of full-size buckets actually used. We should emphasize that the numbers
shown in Table 12 are only one example of the various good configurations selected by the
process described in Section 3.6.1.1. The total number of full-size buckets needed could
be much smaller by two to ten folds, at the cost of a little more total memory utilization
(typically around 1 to 5%).
6We note that the memory savings for counting bytes would be less, due to the much larger M. Consider-
ing the typical average packet size is around 500 bytes, 9 more bits are needed per counter for both the naive
implementation and the BRICK implementation.
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In Table 12, we see that only a small number of full-size buckets are needed to guaran-
tee a tiny probability (P f = 10−10) that we will have insufficient number of full-size buckets
to handle bucket overflows. J∗ denotes the actual number of full-size buckets used when no
random permutation is used. J∗∗ denotes the actual number of full-size buckets used when
permutation is done by reversing bits. We could see that J∗ is similar to or even worse than
the calculated J. This is because that our guarantee is based on randomized permutation,
and for J∗ no permutation is used. In this experiment, the larger flows tend be concen-
trated in lower index counters, thus causing those buckets to overflow to full-size buckets.
However, when some very simple “randomization” techniques are used, such as reversing
the bits of the counter index, we could see that actually no full-size buckets are used for
both traces. We emphasize that the J full-size buckets are allocated for guaranteeing a tiny
probability (P f = 10−10) of overflow for any counter value distribution. In summary, this
experiment demonstrates random permutations is crucial to our design and to establish of




In a BRICK implementation, all sub-counter arrays (A j) and index bitmaps (I j) are fixed in
size, and the number and size of buckets are also fixed. Consider the three level case shown
in Table 11 with k = 64. Both lookup and increment operations can be performed with 10
memory accesses in total, 5 reads and 5 writes. For the bucket being read or updated, we
first retrieve all bitmaps (I j), bucket overflow status flag f`, and an index field t` to a full-
size bucket in case a bucket overflow has previously occurred. All this information for a
bucket can be retrieved in two memory reads with 64-bit words, the first word corresponds
to I1 with 64-bits, and the second word stores I2 = 3 bits, the overflow status flag, and the
t` (about 7 bits). If f` is not set, then we need up to three reads and writes to update the
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three levels of sub-counter arrays. The updated index bitmaps and overflow status flags can
be written back in two memory writes. If f` has been set, then we read directly from the
corresponding entry in the full-size bucket indicated by t` for a lookup operation, avoiding
the need to read the sub-counter arrays, hence requiring fewer memory acceses. Similarly,
an increment operation for a counter that is already in a full-size bucket takes only one read
and one write to update. If a bucket overflow occurs during an increment of a counter in a
bucket, there is no need to access the last sub-counter array (otherwise, we wouldn’t have
an overflow). Therefore, we save two memory accesses at the expense of one write to the
full-size bucket. With index bitmaps, overflow status flag, and full-size index field packed
into two words, the worst case number of memory accesses is 10 in total, which permits
updates in 20ns with a 2ns SRAM time, enabling over 15 million packets per second of
updates.
BRICK is also amenable to pipelining in hardware. In general, the lookup or update
of each successive level of sub-counter arrays can be pipelined such that at each packet
arrival, a lookup or update can operate on A1 while a previous operation operates on A2,
and so forth. This enables the processing of hundreds of millions of packets per second.
3.8 Conclusion
In this chapter, we have presented a novel exact active statistics counter architecture called
BRICK (Bucketized Rank Indexed Counters) that can very efficiently store large arrays
of variable width counters entirely in SRAM while supporting extremely fast increments
and lookups. This high memory (SRAM) efficiency is achieved through a statistical multi-
plexing technique, which by grouping a fixed number of randomly selected counters into a
bucket, allows us to tightly bound the amount of memory that needs to be allocated to each
bucket. Statistical guarantees of BRICK are proven using a combination of stochastic or-
dering theory and probabilistic tail bound techniques. We also employed the rank-indexing
data structure, similar to the rank-indexing technique in Chapter 2, to allow for fast random
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access of every counter inside a bucket. Experiments with real-world Internet traffic traces
show that our solution can indeed maintain large arrays of exact active statistics counters
with moderate amounts of SRAM.
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CHAPTER IV
DESIGN AND ANALYSIS OF ERROR ESTIMATING CODING:
NEW SKETCHES, ESTIMATORS AND ANALYSIS FRAMEWORK
4.1 Problem Overview
Estimating the bit error rate (BER) in packets transmitted over wireless networks has been
established as an important research problem in the seminal work of Chen et al. [13].
It was shown in [13] that, if the BER in packets can be accurately estimated, important
operations in wireless networks such as packet re-scheduling, routing, and carrier selection
can all be performed with greater efficiency. A simple yet effective technique, called error
estimating codes (EEC), is proposed in [13] to help estimate this BER. Its basic idea is for
the transmitter to send along with a packet a set of parity-check bits, each of which is the
exclusive-or of a group of bits randomly sampled from the packet. These parity equations
are designed in such a way that, by counting how many of them are violated after the packet
transmission, the receiver can estimate, with low relative error, this BER.
Using an EEC of O(log n) bits for a packet n bits long, their technique guarantees that
the estimated BER falls within 1± ε of the actual BER with probability at least 1−δ, where
ε and δ are tunable parameters that can be made arbitrarily small at the cost of increased
constant factor in O(log n), the coding overhead.
A natural question to ask is whether EEC achieves the best tradeoff between space
(O(log n)) and estimation accuracy ((ε, δ) guarantee) in solving the BER estimation prob-
lem. In this dissertation work, we answer this question definitively from a very different
alternative angle. While the EEC work looks at this problem from by and large a coding
theoretic perspective, we can also look at it from a theoretical computer science perspec-
tive, modeling it as a so-called two-party computation problem as follows. Two parties
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Alice and Bob each knows a (local) binary string x and y respectively, but Alice has no
knowledge of y and vice versa. Alice and Bob are faced with the problem of computing the
value of a function f acting upon the inputs x and y, often approximately. Intuitively, given
any “sufficiently nontrivial” function f , for Alice and Bob to compute f (x, y) together even
approximately, either Alice has to tell Bob something about x or Bob needs to tell Alice
something about y. The theory of two-party computation is concerned with how to eval-
uate f (x, y) using as little communication (telling the other party about their local strings)
between Alice and Bob as possible. Such a minimum amount of communication needed
for the two-party computation of f (x, y) is referred to as its communication complexity.
In the context of this work, two parties Alice and Bob are the transmitter and the receiver
respectively. Alice knows the string (packet) x that is transmitted and Bob knows the string
(packet) y that is received. The function f we would like to evaluate on (x, y) is clearly the
Hamming distance between x and y, that is, ||x− y||0 (L0 norm of the difference). We would
like to find out the minimum amount of extra information (about x) that Alice needs to send
to Bob, alongside with x, in order for Bob to approximately estimate f (x, y). Techniques
for (most) compactly encoding such extra information (about x) are referred to as sketching
algorithms and the resulting encodings are called sketches.
Casting this BER estimation problem into the rich theoretical framework of two-party
computation allows us to look much deeper into its underlying mathematical structures
and obtain a set of new and better results. We can hence prove that the (randomized)
communication complexity for the two-party computation of ||x−y||0 is Ω(log n), where n is
the length of the string x and y. In other words, Alice (the sender) needs to send to Bob (the
receiver) a minimum of Ω(log n) bits in order for Bob to approximately compute ||x − y||0.
Since the number of overhead bits used in the EEC algorithm is indeed O(log n) [13], it
matches this lower bound and is therefore asymptotically optimal.
A natural deeper and more important question following up is whether EEC has achieved
the desired optimal space-accuracy tradeoff. In this dissertation work, we will answer this
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question in Section 4.6 and demonstrate that EEC decoding is inefficient by deriving the
amount of Fisher information contained in EEC codewords and showing that the variance
of the estimator used in EEC encoding is much larger than the corresponding Cramer-Rao
bound. In fact, we find that EEC codewords contain around one time more information
than that is utilized by the estimator proposed in [13].
In order to overcome the inefficiency of the original EEC scheme, we then propose
a new estimator that achieves a significantly higher estimation accuracy and is provably
near-optimal by almost matching the Cramer-Rao bound. Our experiments will show that
this new estimator allows us to reduce the coding overhead by as much as two to three
times while achieving the same BER estimation accuracy. Another salient property of this
new estimator is that its variance can be approximated by a closed-form formula, making
it much easier to parameterize the EEC algorithm (i.e., to “tune”) for optimal estimation
accuracies (i.e., minimum variance) under various bit error models.
Successive to the improvement on the decoding part, we proceed to investigate whether
there are inefficiencies with the encoding part of EEC. This question is, however, much
harder to answer definitively because existing lower-bound techniques, rooted in the the-
ory of communication complexity [41], only allow us to establish asymptotic space lower
bounds such as the aforementioned Ω(log n) bound.
Our first discovery on this actually still derives from two-party communication angle
presented above. From that angle, our goal is actually is just measuring the the Hamming
distance ||x−y||0 (the number of errors occurring during transmission), which is actually the
same as ||x−y||1 (L1 norm) and ||x−y||2 (L2 norm)1. Various sketches have been proposed to
compactly encode a (long) string x for the two-party computations of ||x− y||0, ||x− y||1, and
||x − y||2. Among them, we discover that the tug-of-war sketch [3] proposed for estimating
the L2 norms is most suitable for our purposes.
1Let xi and yi be the ith bit in x and y respectively, i = 1, 2, ..., n. Then the Lp norm of the difference vector
x − y is defined as
(∑n





However, the tug-of-war sketch per se is not yet the right solution to our problem for
several reasons, which will be discussed in detail in Section 4.5. In short, we come on
several nice techniques to make the solution competitive and we name it as “Enhanced
Tug-of-War Sketch” (EToW).
Our next discovery, is that EEC and EToW can actually be viewed as different instances
of a unified coding framework that we call generalized EEC (gEEC). In other words, gEEC
can be parameterized into both EEC and EToW, and EEC can be viewed as a “degenerate”
case of gEEC.
This generalization makes it easier for us to analyze and improve the designs of both
EEC and EToW for two reasons. First, we need only design a single optimal decoder (i.e.,
estimator) for gEEC, which applies to both EEC and EToW, instead of one for each. This
decoder is a Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE) with the Jeffreys prior, which in the
case of EEC is the aforementioned estimator, and in the case of EToW performs better than
a different estimator we developed for EToW in [30]. Second, the Fisher information for-
mula derived for gEEC, which is in a closed form of matrix computations, applies to both
EEC and EToW. Through this unified framework of gEEC, we found that some parameteri-
zation of gEEC (similar to EToW, but not needing the extra error detection bits) can contain
around 25% more information than the pure EEC scheme. This information gain cannot be
fully decoded through EToW’s decoder, but is achievable by gEEC’s decoder.
Note that, although the second discovery presented above looks comprehensive than
EToW, EToW still has its special advantage in its simple decoding process.
4.2 Background, Preliminaries and Related Works
In this section, we will firstly overview the EEC problem and then provide the backgrounds
related to the problem here.
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4.2.1 Error Estimating Codes (EEC)
Error correcting coding [44] has been playing a fundamental and critical role in commu-
nication systems for more than fifty years, behind which is a philosophy that application
and network can or should only deal with entirely correct data. However, in recent years,
partially correct packets are found to be also useful in more and more designs, such as the
designs with incremental redundancy ARQ[43], the designs that may collect and combine
multiple partially correct packets[19, 36], the designs with forward error corrections[20],
and audio/video communication where errors could be tolerated to some extent[57].
The seminal paper of Chen et al. [13] has brought to the fore the problem of (approx-
imately) estimating the number of bit errors (correspondingly the bit error rate, BER) that
has occurred to a packet during its transmission over a wireless network. In contrast of error
correcting coding, Chen et al. [13] aim to use much smaller overhead while only providing
light-weight function: merely estimating the number of bit errors without correcting them.
A simple yet effective technique, called error estimating codes (EEC), is proposed in [13]
to help estimate this BER. It has been shown in [13] that knowing this (approximate) bit
error rate (BER) of a packet makes possible a host of advanced packet processing capabil-
ities such as packet re-scheduling, routing, and carrier-selection schemes that can improve
the (good) throughput of a wireless network in various ways. Compared to the previous
solutions , which either uses indirect inference such as packet loss ratio and signal/noise
ratio [29, 65], or needs special hardware support in the lower layer with the soft decoding
capability [64], the EEC solution directly infers the BER from the packet and achieve better
accuracy while also doesn’t need special hardware support.
In EEC [13], the codeword for a packet consists of a set of m = ab parity bits z1, z2, ...,
zm. They form a groups of size b each, {z1, z2, ..., zb}, {zb+1, zb+2, ..., z2b}, ..., {z(a−1)b+1, z(a−1)b+2, ..., zab}.
Each parity bit zi that belongs to group j (i.e., ( j − 1) ∗ b + 1 ≤ i ≤ jb) is calculated as
the XOR of a set of li = 2 j − 1 bits uniformly (pseudo-)randomly sampled with replace-
ment from the packet (viewed as a bit array). The size of groups (li’s) are geometrically
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distributed to maintain a good “estimation resolution” on a wide range of different BERs.
In the following, we refer to each such group as a level to be consistent with the terms used
in [13]. The codeword thus computed will be sent along with the packet to the receiver.
Note the encoding scheme of EEC has some flavor of Low Density Parity Check (LDPC)
codes although its parity check matrix is not strictly sparse as some of the rows can have
as many as 2a (including the parity check bit itself) ones in it, and in LDPC, no bit will be
sampled more than once, which may happen in EEC due to its sampling with replacement
nature.
Upon the receipt of a packet and its codeword (possibly with one or more bits flipped
during transmission), the receiver will multiply them (viewed as a vector) by the same
parity check matrix2 and infer the BER from the outcome of this multiplication, which
is often referred to as a syndrome vector in coding theory literature. From the syndrome
vector, the inference algorithm (i.e., the decoder) used in [13] first decides on the group
(i.e., level) of parity check bits that are expected to provide the best estimation accuracy.
Then BER will be estimated only from the corresponding syndrome bits within that group.
The authors of [13] showed that that their scheme with 9 levels and less than 300
additional bits in total per packet would be able to well differentiate BER rate in range
[10−3, 0.15], and it would work well in real-world wireless experiments and is a great
enhancement. They also show that they provide a (ε, δ) bound analysis of the proposed
scheme, i.e. they could guarantee at most ε relative error that failed with probability less
than δ, where ε and δ are arbitrarily tunable parameters that determine the overhead cost of
their algorithm. In total they need about O(log (n)) overhead for an n bit packet to achieve
error estimating rates within the threshold desired by target applications.
2Both the sender and the receiver know this matrix.
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4.2.2 Randomized Approximation and Communication Complexity
Randomized approximation: The original EEC scheme, the tug-of-war sketch to be pre-
sented in Section 4.4.1, and the generalized EEC scheme to be presented in Section 4.7, are
(ε, δ)-approximation schemes. An (ε, δ)-approximation algorithm is one that produces an
estimate X̂ for some quantity X with the guarantee that the absolute relative error |X̂ −X|/X
is at most ε with probability at least 1 − δ. It is assumed that 0 < ε, δ < 1 are arbitrary con-
stants that can be tuned by the designer of the algorithm. Typically, the cost of the scheme
is dependent on these two parameters.
Communication complexity: Many of our lower bounds on this dissertation research
make direct use of results from the communication complexity literature [41]. As men-
tioned before, communication complexity deals with the problem of determining the exact
amount of communication needed between two parties to compute some function on their
non-overlapping but jointly complete input. The communication complexity of a function
at input size n is the largest number of bits that the two parties have to communication
with each other using the optimal protocol for any input of size n. The basic communi-
cation complexity model can be generalized in many ways, two of which—randomization
and one-round—appear in this thesis. The randomized communication complexity of a
function is the communication complexity of an optimal randomized protocol that is cor-
rect with some positive constant probability (over random choices of the protocol). The
one-round communication complexity of a function is the communication complexity of
an optimal protocol in which Alice sends a single message to Bob, and Bob then computes
the result of the function with no further communication. The problem of estimating BER
clearly corresponds to the one-round model. Randomization is also allowed in our context
and is actually used by both EEC and our scheme.
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4.2.3 Fisher Information and Cramer-Rao Bound
In information theory and mathematical statistics, Fisher information quantifies the amount
of information an observable parameterized random variable X(θ) carries about its un-
known parameter θ. (Our description closely follows [16]; please consult it for more
background on this topic.) In our context, the error estimating codewords and sketches
correspond to random variable X(θ) and θ corresponds to the BER we would like to esti-
mate in a received packet. The probability function of X(θ) takes the form f (x; θ). When
θ is viewed as a constant and x as a variable, f (x; θ) is the probability density (or mass) of
the random variable X conditional on the value of θ; When θ is viewed as a variable and x
as a constant on the other hand, f (x; θ) is the likelihood function of θ, that is, the likelihood
of the parameter taking value θ when the observed value of X is x. Fisher information of





log f (X; θ))
]2
. (15)
Fisher information J(θ) is an important quantity because it determines the minimum
variance achievable by any unbiased estimator of θ given an observation of X(θ), through
the Cramer-Rao lower bound (CRLB):










While it is possible for a biased estimator to “beat” the Cramer-Rao bound for unbiased
estimators (Formula (2)) when θ takes certain values (over which b′(θ) takes negative val-
ues), that biased estimator is not a clear winner since bias comes at a cost and may not be
desirable to many applications.
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In the context of this work, where the goal is to measure the “scale” of the bit error
rate θ, the statistics of the relative error θ̂−θ
θ
and the log-difference log θ̂ − log θ are more
important. In particular, we prefer to use the statistics of the log-difference rather than the
relative ratio to evaluate the performance of an estimator, since it assigns higher penalty to
large deviations, making the comparison fairer for this application setting. For example,
suppose the real value of θ is 0.1, and three large-deviation estimates are 0.05, 0.19 and
0.01, then the penalty for the last one will be much larger if measured by log θ̂’s statistics.
However, when measured by the relative error, the penalties of the latter two are the same
and just around twice of the first.
The C-R bound for both θ̂−θ
θ




























Interestingly, they are bounded by the same value, θ2J(θ). The second inequality (19) is
derived by a transformation from (16). In other words, θ2J(θ) is the Fisher information of
log θ. We will use θ2J(θ) frequently throughout the chapter since it will directly determine
the bound of the relative error/log difference.3
The maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) of θ, defined as θ̂MLE , arg maxθ{ f (x; θ)}, is
known to be asymptotically normal (denoted as N(∗, ∗)) under certain regularity conditions








where t here denotes the number of repeated independent experiments and J(θ) denotes the
Fisher information contributed from each experiment. Hence the Cramer-Rao lower bound
is (asymptotically) reached by the MLE.
3There is another concept called relative Fisher information established in information theory which is
not related to anything here.
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Fisher information and Cramer-Rao bound analysis has been used in a few previous
works on network measurement in the literature. It has been used by Ribeiro et al. [54] to
derive the minimum number of samples needed for accurately estimating flow size distribu-
tions from outputs of a packet sampling process (e.g., sampled Cisco NetFlow). They also
proposed an unbiased MLE estimator for this estimation problem that empirically matches
the Cramer-Rao bound. This work was followed up in [60] by Tune et al. who demon-
strated through Fisher information analysis that samples collected by flow sampling, which
is much more expensive computationally, are more information-rich, in terms of Fisher in-
formation per bit, than packet sampling. They then proposed a new hybrid sampling tech-
nique called dual sampling that combines the advantages of both flow and packet sampling.
Fisher information analysis is also used in recent work [61] to compare the information-
richness of the samples collected by a few packet sampling and sketching techniques for
the purpose of estimating flow size distributions.
4.2.4 Data Streaming and Communication Complexity
One of the major technical contribution that we make in this thesis is to adapt sketching
algorithms from the field of data streaming to this problem. Data streaming is a well-
studied area with a rich literature [52]. In the data streaming model, the input is provided
as a long stream of updates in which only a single pass is allowed over the stream and the
memory and time of the algorithm is heavily constrained (in particular much smaller than
the size of the input). The connection to this problem is that there are many streaming
algorithms that can be used to compute the difference (or distance) between two streams,
and the summaries of these algorithms (called sketches) are what we can use as overhead
bits for this problem. We tried several different sketching algorithms, including the count-
min sketch [15], the Flajolet-Martin (FM) sketch [25], the stable distribution sketch [34],
before settling on our variation on the tug-of-war sketch [3]. The tug-of-war sketch was
originally suggested by Alon et al. [3] for estimating the second frequency moment of a data
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stream. The governing characteristic of this sketch, that we make use of in this thesis, is
that it is a random projection of the input, thereby allowing for deletions from the received
packet. This sketch was modified for measuring the L1 distance of streams by Feigenbaum
et al. [23].
As for the proof of the lower bounds, our lower bounds make direct use of known
results for the communication complexity [41] of the Hamming distance problem. Our
main lower bound, showing that Ω(log (n)/ε2) overhead is necessary is a consequence of
the communication complexity result from [38].
4.2.5 Definitions and notes of Notations
For convenience, all major notations that will be used are summarized in the following
table for future reference
4.3 Lower Bounds
We next show lower bounds for the BER estimation problem, demonstrating the optimality
of our algorithms. In Sec. III.A, we show that deterministically estimating the error rate
(i.e., without the use of randomization) requires the coding scheme to use Ω(n) bits of over-
head even when we allow the estimate to err by over 10% from the actual value. Similarly,
we show in Sec. III.B that randomization alone cannot produce the exact BER estimation
using a well-known result from the area of communication complexity. Based on these two
results, one can see why we can only approximate the result with high probability. Finally,
we show in Sec. III.C why the O(log n)-bit sketch our algorithms use is necessary.
4.3.1 Why Randomization Is Needed
Theorem 1. Any error-estimating scheme that estimates the number of the bits in an n-bit
packet that change during transmission to within n/8 must use Ω(n) overhead bits.
Proof. Let n be divisible by 8 (the argument works for all n with some slight modifications).
It is known that there exists a family G of 2Ω(n) subsets of {1, 2, 3, . . . , n} such that (i) each set
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Notation Definition Schemes Note
Parameters
n binary length of the origi-
nal packet (data size)
All schemes In practice, typically less
than 12,000 (1500bytes)
m binary length of the sketch
bits for EEC purpose
All schemes Typically 80 to 300 bits
li sampling group size of the
ith EEC-bit/sub-sketch
EEC/gEEC Dependant on application.
l sampling group size of
each sub-sketch
EToW Dependant on application.
k the binary length of the ith
sub-sketch sent
EToW Typically 3-5
ki the binary length of the ith
sub-sketch sent
gEEC Typically 1-6
r the binary length of the




θ bit error rate (BER) All schemes We are estimating the BER
of each packet, not BER of
the channel.
θ̂ Estimator of θ All schemes
−→





defined in {−1, 1}n, unless
specifically designated
−→si Binary random vector for
the ith sub-sketch
EToW,gEEC n-entries(bits), defined in
{−1, 1}n




b′ the data bits received All schemes 1-bit in EEC, k-bit in








EEC/EToW,gEECThe same size as above
ži or
−→
ži the ith EEC-bit/sub-sketch
received
EEC/EToW,gEECThe same size as above
qi the checking bits for ith
sub-sketch sent
EToW r-bits
q̌i the checking bits for ith
sub-sketch received
EToW The same size as above
Table 13: Definition of symbols for Error Estimating Problem
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in G has cardinality exactly n/4, and (ii) every pair of sets in G have at most n/8 elements
in common. The existence of such a family can be shown using the probabilistic method,
but this is omitted here for brevity.
Let us assume for a contradiction that there exists a deterministic sketch of size less
than Ω(n) bits that allows the computation of the Hamming distance between the original
and transmitted codewords within an error of less than n/8. Consider what happens when
we sketch all the codewords formed by the characteristic vectors of the sets in G. Since the
sketch size is less than log (|G|) = Ω(n), by the pigeonhole principle we know that two of
the sets, say g1 and g2, in G must result in the same sketch value, making them indistin-
guishable. The Hamming distance between these two sets is at least n/8 + n/8 = n/4. As
a result, since the sketch cannot distinguish between the cases when the original codeword
and the transmitted codeword correspond to g1 and g1, versus when they correspond to g1
and g2, respectively, one of these two cases must have an error of at least n/8. 
4.3.2 Why Approximation is Needed
Theorem 2. Any error-estimating scheme that computes the exact number of bits in an
n-bit packet that change during transmission with probability at least 3/4 must use Ω(n)
overhead bits.
Proof. For this result, we use the communication complexity of the Set Disjointness prob-
lem. It is known that for two parties to compute whether their subsets of {1, 2, 3, . . . , n}
have any elements in common requires Ω(n) communication, even when randomization
(with 1/4 failure probability) is allowed [37].
Assume for a contradiction that there is a randomized sketch using less than Ω(n) bits
that can be used to compute the Hamming distance between the original and transmitted
codewords exactly. We use this to create the following protocol for Set Disjointness. Alice
uses the sketch to summarize the characteristic vector of her set and sends the sketch (less
than Ω(n) bits) and the number of elements in her set (log n bits), call it na, to Bob. Bob
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can now use this information to compute the Hamming distance (call it h), the number of
elements in his set (call it nb), and then compute the size of the intersection of his and
Alice’s set as (na + nb − h)/2. This is a one-round randomized protocol to compute the
size of the intersection of Alice and Bob’s sets, and hence must use Ω(n) communication,
contradicting our assumption about the size of the sketch. 
4.3.3 Randomized Approximation
We now use a lower bound in [38] to show that the asymptotic complexity of the tug-of-war
sketch and the original EEC scheme are optimal in terms of their dependence on n and ε,
the relative error bound. The lower bound result we use is as follows:
Theorem 3 ([38, 66]). The randomized one-round two-party communication complexity of
approximating the Hamming distance of the n-bit vectors of two parties up to a relative
error of ε with constant probability is at least Ω(log (n)/ε2).
The reduction is the same as the last, and a lower bound of Ω(log (n)/ε2) on the sketch
size follows.
4.4 Tug-of-War Sketch for Error Estimating Coding
4.4.1 The sketch
In this section, we briefly describe and analyze the plain vanilla tug-of-war sketch [3] in
the context of error estimating coding, under the assumption that the sketch per se is not
subject to bit errors during transmission. The tug-of-war sketch of a bit array (packet)
b is comprised of a constant number c of counters (c is determined by the desired error
guarantees) that are maintained using the same update algorithm (with possibly different
update values) and is sent to the receiver alongside with b. After the execution of these
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update algorithms, each counter contains the inner product of the bit array4
−→
b with a pre-
defined pseudorandom vector −→s ∈ {+1,−1}n. Note the actual update algorithm is not shown
here because it is not relevant to our context; Only its “net effect” after execution is.
As shown in the following algorithm, upon the receipt of the transmitted bit array
−→
b′ and
the sketch (assumed to have no bit error during transmission), the receiver computes the c
inner products using the received packet (possibly with bit errors)
−→
b′, takes the difference
between them and the counters in the sketch sent along the packet, and squares the result.
Each of these results is now an unbiased estimate (proved in [3]) of the Hamming distance
between the original and the transmitted packets, and can be averaged to give an accurate
estimate of the Hamming distance5, d. The details are given in Algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2: The tug-of-war sketch for EEC.
SKETCH–CREATION(~b)1
Input ~b: original data bits vector.
Output z: the sketch encoding ~b.
pre-compute random vectors ~s j,1≤ j≤c : [n]→ {−1, 1}
for j = 1 to c do
z j := (~b · ~s j)/2
end for
return z = 〈z1, . . . , zc〉
DISTANCE–ESTIMATION(~b′, z)
Input ~b′: received data bits vector, z: received sketch.
Output p̂: the estimated error rate.
pre-compute random vectors ~s j,1≤ j≤c : [n]→ {−1, 1}
for j = 1 to c do
X j := (z j − ~b′ · ~s j/2)2
end for
return θ̂= 1naverage(X1, . . . , Xc)
4Here
−→
b is the vector representation of the packet b, where ‘0’s have been converted to ‘-1’s as discussed
earlier.
5Note that this is a simplified form of the tug-of-war sketch proposed in [3]. The original version reduced
the dependence on δ to log (1/δ) by computing the average of O( 1
ε2
) estimators and then finding the median of
O(log (1/δ)) such groups, at the cost of a larger constant multiplicative factor. For simplicity of the analysis
in the following section, we omit this asymptotic improvement here.
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4.4.2 Analysis
We now show that this estimator (the average of component random variables X1, X2, . . . ,
Xc) has low variance. To compute the variance of each component X j, we first compute
















= d + 6d(d − 1)/2
= 3d2 − 2d, (21)
Substituting this into the expression for the variance of X j, we obtain
Var[X j] = E[X2j ] − (E[X j])
2
= 3d2 − 2d − d2 ≤ 2d2.
Although the variance of a single component X j may look large (giving a standard
deviation larger than d itself), averaging c of them reduces it by a factor of c. Using
Chebyschev’s inequality then allows us to bound the failure probability arbitrarily small
as well (depending solely on how large we allow c to get). More concretely, if we pick
c = 2
ε2δ
, then by Chebyschev’s inequality we get that the estimate d̂ from the above algo-
rithm has the guarantee







Correspondingly, the relative error of the final estimate of θ̂ = 1n d̂ would also satisfy the
ε − δ bound:
Pr[|θ̂ − θ| ≥ εθ] = Pr[|d̂ − d| ≥ εd] ≤ δ.
The total overhead of this scheme is that of sending c = 2
ε2δ
(a constant, independent of
n) counters, each of which contains a number in the range [−n, n]. Hence, the asymptotic
cost is O(log n) bits.
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4.4.3 Cost and Overhead for EEC applications
In this section, we perform a rough estimate of the total size of the sketch if the plain
vanilla tug-of-war sketch is used directly for EEC applications. This is needed for us to
compare it with our enhanced sketch, to be described in the next section. To allow for a
fair comparison, here we no longer assume the sketch is immune from bit errors during
transmissions. The total size of the sketch is determined by three factors: the number of
counters c, the size of each counter (denoted as k), and the number of extra bits needed to
protect the sketch. Since our enhanced sketch uses the same number of counters, we only
need to discuss the second and third factors here for comparison purposes.
To estimate the size of each counter, let us assume that the (maximum) length of the
packet is 1500 bytes = 1.2 × 104 bits. In the worst case log2(n) = log2(12000) ≈ 14 is
needed per counter, since max(~b · ~s/2) = n/2 and min(~b · ~s/2) = −n/2. However, the
value of each counter in the sketch, which is a random variable, has its probability densities
concentrated around its mean 0, since ~b · ~s is the sum of n i.i.d. Bernoulli random variables
bisi, each of which takes value +1 or −1 with equal probability 0.5. We calculate the
tail probability of the resulting Binomial distribution and find Pr(|Z| > 255) ≈ 3 × 10−6.
Therefore, if we truncate each counter to 9 bits (including one sign bit, since z could be
positive or negative) from 14, we risk overflowing it with probability 3 × 10−6.
A lower bound of the number of additional bits needed to protect the sketch can be
estimated using information theory as follows. Suppose the bit errors are symmetric (equal
probability in flipping 1 to 0 and the other way around) and random, the amount of infor-
mation brought by each bit received is:
I(θ) = 1 + θ lg θ + (1 − θ) lg(1 − θ).
Therefore, the final size of the sketch, including all the protection bits, needs to be at
least I(θ)−1 times larger than the original sketch. For example, when the error rate is 0.15,
the blowup factor I(0.15)−1 is equal to 2.56.
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Summing all above factors together, our back-of-envelope conclusion is: when the
overheads of extra protection is not counted in, roughly 16 × 9 = 144 would be able to
deliver comparable performance. Compared with the 9× 32 = 288 bits needed by the EEC
scheme, using tug-of-war sketch would gain considerable reduction on the overhead while
the estimation procedure would be very simple. However, when the extra protection cost is
counted in, the tug-of-war sketch would be no longer of too much advantage.
In the next section, we would present the enhanced tug-of-war sketch, which could
reduce the size of each counter by roughly another half and protect the sketch with small
overhead, while still delivering comparable performance.
4.5 Enhanced Tug-of-war Sketch (EToW): Scheme and Analysis
As mentioned before, we enhance the vanilla tug-of-war sketch in the following three ways
to achieve better space-accuracy tradeoffs and to be able to handle bit errors that may
occur to the sketch. As shown in Algorithm 3, our enhanced sketch contains a number of
important improvements.
First, in some BER estimation scenarios, we need only know whether the BER falls
into a certain interval like [2−i, 2−i+1], as suggested in [13], rather than the exact BER value.
In some others, only a rough BER estimation is called for. The vanilla tug-of-war sketch
can be an overkill for both types of scenarios at the cost of an unnecessarily large sketch
size. Adding to the problem is the fact that a larger sketch is more susceptible to bit errors
during transmission and requires stronger protections which we can ill afford. Our solution
is to combine sampling with sketching, in which we randomly sample l bits of the packet
and sketch only these l bits according to Algorithm 3. A smaller l value leads to a smaller
counter size and hence a smaller sketch size, at the cost of lower BER estimation accuracy
due to higher sampling error. By adjusting this parameter l, we can minimize the sketch
size needed to achieve a desired level of accuracy. The analysis needed for tuning this
parameter for best size-accuracy tradeoffs is presented later in Sec. 4.5.1.
91
Figure 16: Overview of Enhanced Tug-of-War (EToW) Sketch (Algorithm 3)
Second, as we mentioned before, since the counter value (a random variable) stays close
to its mean 0 with high probability, we may use fewer (say k) bits to store it without causing
an “overflow” most of time. We refer to this enhancement as “statistical truncation”, or
truncation in short, for the lack of a better word. Even when an overflow (at either the
sender or the receiver side) does happen (albeit with a small probability), its impact on
estimation is small because with high probability truncation happens at both sides, in which
case their difference remain the same as when there are no truncations. The impact of
statistical truncation on the estimation accuracy will be analyzed in Sec. 4.5.2.
Finally, as previously mentioned, the sketch is not immune to bit errors during trans-
mission and requires some protection. In our scheme, each counter (5 bits long) will be
protected by a parity bit (an overhead ratio of 20%). Any counter that fails the parity check
will be considered corrupted and will not be included in the estimation. The rationale for
this choice will be explained in Sec. 4.5.3.
The parameters of the enhanced tug-of-war sketch in the following analyses are as fol-
lows. We let c be the total number of counters, l the number of bit positions sampled, k the
length of each counter, and r the length of the parity bits of each counter. For convenience,
we denote the sketch by Sketch(c, l, k, r). The total transmission cost is c(k + r).
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Algorithm 3: Enhanced tug-of-war sketch with parameters (c, l, k, r).
SKETCH–CREATION(~b)1
Input ~b: original data bits vector.
Output z: the sketch of ~b.
pre-compute l-bit-long vectors ~s j,1≤ j≤c : [l]→ {−1, 1}
for j = 1 to c do
l-bits-long vector ~b j: sampled with replacement from ~b
Random projection: z̃ j := (~b j · ~s j)/2
k-bits-long truncated projection: z j := trunck(z̃ j)
r-bits-long parities q j := parityr(z j)
end for
return c(k + r)-bits long sketch z = 〈z1, . . . , zc〉〈q1, . . . , qc〉
DISTANCE–ESTIMATION(~b′, ž)
Input ~b′: received data bits vector, ž′: received sketch.
Output θ̂: estimate of the error rate θ.
pre-compute l-bit-long vectors ~s j,1≤ j≤c : [l]→ {−1, 1}
for j = 1 to c do
l-bits-long vector ~b′j: sampled with replacement from ~b
′
(with the same hash seed pre-configured.)
Random projection: z̃ j′ := (~b′j · ~s j)/2
Estimation Y j := trunck(z̃ j′ − ž j) ,X j = Y2j








as the estimation of error rate θ.
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4.5.1 Analysis of the effect of sampling
Here we provide a simple analysis of the “sampled tug-of-war sketch” and show the benefits
of sampling. In this analysis, we assume that no truncation is used and that no bit error
happens during the transmission of the sketch. The value of a full (un-truncated) counter
(a random variable) is denoted as z̃. Note that we use X̃ j := 1l (z̃ j − z j)
2 to estimate the error
rate θ = d/n.
Note that the Hamming distance between the two sampled segments, denoted by D,
is no longer a constant. From Section 4.4, we have E[X2j |D j] = D j and Var[X
2
j |D j] =
3D2j−2D j. Since the l bits are sampled with replacement, D follows a binomial distribution,
E[D] = lp and Var[D] = lp(1 − θ), where θ is the error rate.






































Compared with (21), the relative variance of the sampled tug-of-war sketch is bounded
by 2 plus an additional term 1pl . This means only when θ is Ω(
1
l ) will the estimator achieve
good performance. We can clearly observe this difference in Fig. 17. The sampled sketch
with l = 512 performs very close to the original tug-of-war sketch when θ > 10−2, and
much worse when θ < 10−3. From a practical perspective, this is exactly what we have
intended. In typical application scenarios exemplified by [13], very accurate estimation




































Original ToW Sketch, c=16
Sampled ToW Sketch with l=512,c=16
Sampled ToW Sketch with l=1024,c=16
Figure 17: Comparison of the variance of the sampled tug-of-war sketches and the original
one, with c = 16.
sampled tug-of-war sketch enables users to make the best use of bits for the applications
we are interested in.
As discussed in Sec. 4.3, the communication complexity bound for measuring the Ham-
ming distance is Ω(log n). Both the original tug-of-war sketch and the EEC sketch match
this bound. The sampled tug-of-war sketch uses only O(log l) bits, where l is a constant pa-
rameter that can be much less than n. This does not contradict our lower bound, however,
since it does not deliver the target estimation accuracy ((ε, δ)-approximation) for inputs
with certain BER parameter settings.
4.5.2 Analysis of truncation and sampling together
In this section, we analyze the impact of truncation on the overall estimation accuracy.
The operation of truncating a counter value to a k-bit number (including one bit needed to
represent the sign) can be formalized as follows:
z = trunck(z̃) ≡ z̃(mod 2k), z ∈ [−2k−1, 2k−1 − 1]. (23)
As shown in Algorithm 3 and Figure 16, we defined Z̃ j
′




We can find the following relationship between Y j and the original (un-truncated) sketch
values Z̃ j and Z̃ j
′ as follows:
Y j = trunck(Z̃ j
′
− Z j) ,Y ∈ [−2k−1, 2k−1 − 1]
≡ Z̃ j
′
− Z j (mod 2k)
≡ Z̃ j
′
− Z̃ j (mod 2k), due to (23)
≡ trunck(Z̃ j
′
− Z̃ j) (mod 2k) (24)
In the following, we derive the distribution, expectation and variance of each estimator
θ̂ j =
1









Note Yi, i = 1, 2, ..., c, are i.i.d. discrete random variables. Let Y be an arbitrary Yi. In
the following we will derive the probability mass function (PMF) of Y so that we can ana-
lyze the impact of truncation on our estimation accuracy. Since Y takes values on exactly 2k
integer values {−2k−1,−2k−1+1, ..., 2k−1−1}, its PMF can be determined by a 2k-dimensional
vector ~γ(θ, l) ≡ 〈γ−2k−1(θ, l), γ−2k−1+1(θ, l), ..., γ2k−1−1(θ, l)〉 where γi(θ, l) ≡ Pr(Y = i|θ, l),
i ∈ [−2k−1,−2k−1 + 1, ..., 2k−1 − 1]. Note that each scalar γi is a function of the error rate θ
and the number of bits sampled l. We show that ~γ(θ, l) can be computed from the following
recurrence relation.
Lemma 4.




1 − θ θ/2 · · · 0 · · · θ/2
θ/2 1 − θ θ/2 · · · 0 · · ·
θ/2 1 − θ θ/2 · · · 0 · · ·
· · · · · ·
· · · 0 · · · θ/2 1 − θ θ/2





Proof. Let ~e = 〈e1, e2, · · · , el〉 and ~s = 〈s1, s2, · · · , sl〉. We define the following interim





Clearly, X = Yl(mod 2k). Due to the sampling with replacement policy, the increment in
each step ∆Y j = Y j+1 − Y j = e j+1s j+1 is independent of every other. Hence the random vari-
ables {Y j}0≤ j≤l make up a Markov chain. In each step, with probability 1 − θ an unchanged
bit is selected and hence ∆Y j = 0; with probability θ a changed bit is selected, and half of
these increments are +1 and the other half −1 since sk is uniformly at random from {−1, 1}.
Hence the distribution of ∆Y j is:
∆Y j =

−1 with prob θ/2,
0 with prob 1 − θ,
1 with prob θ/2.
(28)
Mapping {Y j}0≤ j≤l into the finite field Z2k , formula (56) becomes the transition matrix,
which is the circular matrix M defined in (53). 




Ω′Diag(d0, d1, . . . , dK−1)Ω,
where Ω = {ωik}, ωik = exp (
2πik j
K ), j is the imaginary unit, and di = 1 − 2 sin
2 (2iπ/K)θ.
Considering that ~γ(θ, 0) = [0, · · · , 0, 1, 0, · · · ]1×K , where 1 appears at the (2k−1 + 1)th
position, we have




[0, · · · , 1, 0, · · · ]Ω′Diag(dl0, d
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Finally, we can calculate the expectation and the variance of Y2 from ~γ(θ, l) as follows:
E[Y2] = ~γ(θ, l)β2 (30)
Var[Y2] = ~γ(θ, l)β4 − (~γ(θ, l)β2)2, (31)
where βi = [(−2k−1)i, (−2k−1 + 1)i, ..., (2k−1 − 1)i].
After summing up all c counters in the sketch, we finally arrive at the Mean Squared










Var[Y2] + (E[Y2] − pl)2. (32)
Since 1l Ỹ j
2 is unbiased and |trunck(x)| ≤ |x|, 1l Y j
2 will be (slightly) negatively biased.
Note the aforementioned Chebyshev’s inequality still holds for the mean squared error,
while it does not for the variance when the estimator is biased. Because of the bias, the
aforementioned (ε, δ)-approximation guarantee no longer holds for the truncated version of
the tug-of-war sketch.
In Fig. 18, we plot the relative Rooted Mean Squared Error parameterized by several
combinations of k and l. It shows that the sampling parameter l shifts the left wing of the
relative error curve, while the truncation parameter k shifts the right wing.
4.5.3 Impact of bit errors on counters and protection
In this section, we discuss the types of error detection mechanisms that are appropriate for
protecting our enhanced sketch and derive the formula for analyzing their error probabili-
ties. An error detection code can be defined by its generating matrix. For example matrix 1 1 1 1 10 0 1 1 1
 means there are two parity bits per counter. The first parity bit is XOR
of all five bits and the second is the XOR of the three most significant bits. A counter is
considered corrupted during transmission if it fails at least one of the parity checks. A
corrupted counter thus detected will not be used in the BER estimation. However, all cor-






























rRMSE when k=4 l=512
rRMSE when k=4 l=1024
rRMSE when k=5 l=512
rRMSE when k=5 l=1024
rRMSE when k=6 l=512






Figure 18: The relative Rooted Mean Squared Error of the enhanced tug-of-war sketch
(fully protected) with different sampling and truncation parameters, when c = 16, l =
{512, 1024}, k = {4, 5, 6}.
expectation and variance of the sketch differences Y , denoted by γq(θ), when the effects of
both types of corruptions (detected and undetected) are factored. Based on this analysis,
our scheme chooses to have one parity bit per counter, which is the XOR of all 5 bits in the
counter (corresponding to the first row of the above matrix).
We first model the distributions of the errors that survive the parity checking (unde-
tectable errors). The impact of those errors on the estimates Yi can be calculated as follows:
γq(θ) ≈ γ(θ)Q(θ),
where Q(θ) is determined by the design of the parity bit(s). We can then replace the γq in
(30-32) with γq(θ) to derive the expectation, variance and MSE of the final estimate Y2i .
The next step is to take into consideration the impact of detectable errors. Such errors
will not affect the bias of the final θ̂, but will increase its MSE because fewer counters are
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+ (E[Y2] − pl)2, (33)
where θ is the probability with which each counter survives the parity checking. As dis-
cussed earlier, θ is a function of θ and the generating matrix. The error distribution of the
final estimator is also numerically computable, but we omit the details here in the interest
of space.
We compare different constructions of generating matrices in Fig. 19 and the results
can be summarized as follows. First, it is not necessary to parity-check all sketch bits.
However, if too few sketch bits are parity-checked, the accuracies in estimating low BER
can be impaired. This phenomena can be observed by comparing the first three curves
in the legend. Second, two parity bits per counter instead of one does not considerably
improve the accuracy of the final estimation. For this reason, we choose to have one parity
bit per counter in our scheme.
4.6 Fisher Information Analysis of EEC
In this section, we analyze the Fisher information contained in an EEC codeword. Since
each bit in an EEC codeword is generated in the same way independent of each other, it
suffices to analyze the contribution from each bit. The Fisher information of the codeword
is simply the sum of the Fisher information contained in each bit.
Throughout this chapter, we will use notation ži’s to denote the codeword bits (sent
along with the packet) received (hence subjected to transmission errors), and use z′i’s to
denote the codeword bits calculated from the packet received. In the EEC scheme, zi and
z′i are the parity bits of the li bits on the same locations of the original and the received
packets. The receiver computes their difference Xi = ži ⊕ z′i , i = 1, 2, . . . ,m, and infers the




































Figure 19: Comparisons of different constructions of parity-checking bits. When k = 5,
















































l=4 SJ = 1.10C
l=8 SJ = 1.05C
l=16 SJ = 1.02C
l=32 SJ = 1.01C
l=64 SJ = 1.01C
l=128 SJ = 1.00C
l=256 SJ = 1.00C
l=512 SJ = 1.00C
l=1024 SJ = 1.00C
l=2048 SJ = 1.00C
Figure 20: Fisher Information (of log θ) of each EEC bit in function of l and θ
4.6.1 Fisher Information Contained in each EEC bit
To simplify the exposition, we first perform the Fisher information analysis under the un-
realistic assumption that the codeword is immune from corruption during transmission. In
this case, ži’s, the codeword bits received, are the same as zi’s, the codeword bits sent. We
will then handle the more realistic case, without immunity, at the end of this section.
4.6.1.1 The case with “immunity”
Recall Xi defined above indicates whether or not the ith parity equation holds. In the
case with immunity, the likelihood function of observing Xi = 1 (i.e., odd number of bits
“flipped” during transmission among the set of bits sampled) is as follows:






2 j + 1
)
θ2 j+1(1 − θ)li−2 j−1
=




The Fisher information contained in each Xi can be calculated as follows:
JEECi (θ) = Eθ[(
∂
∂θ
log f (Xi; θ))2] (36)
= Pr(Xi = 1|θ)(
∂
∂θ
log f (Xi = 1; θ))2 + Pr(Xi = 0|θ)(
∂
∂θ
log f (Xi = 0; θ))2
=




1 − (1 − 2θ)li
)2
+





1 + (1 − 2θ)li
)2
=
4l2i (1 − 2θ)
2li−2
1 − (1 − 2θ)2li
. (37)
Before we aggregate Fisher information contributed by all the codeword bits, we would
like to highlight some nice properties of the derived Fisher information for a single bit (37).
For convenience of comparisons, we define the Fisher information (of log θ) of each bit as
η(li, θ):
θ2JEECi (θ) =
4θ2l2i (1 − 2θ)
2li−2
1 − (1 − 2θ)2li
, η(li, θ). (38)
As we explained earlier, this is inversely proportional to the Cramer-Rao bound of the
relative variance. The larger η(l, θ), the tighter the bound of the relative error (and the
log-difference) that can be achieved.
Values of η(li, θ) for various li (number of bits sampled) values are plotted in Figure 20.
We can see that the η(l, θ) curves corresponding to different l values are actually very similar
in shape to each other. A larger parity group size l is better for estimating smaller θ values
and vice versa. These curves also have similar “heights” except when l gets really small
(targeting extremely high BER close to the maximum possible value of 0.5). This means
that the “peak estimation powers” of different parity bits are about the same. The maximum
(i.e., “height”) of each curve is always reached around θ = 0.4/l, which means the parity
bit computed from l sampled bits yields the best estimation for θ when θ is around 0.4/l.
We can even quantify how much “information about θ” flows into the whole estimation





θ2J(l, θ)d log θ (39)
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In (39), the upper limit of the integral is 0.5 is because all formulas derived above
(starting from (35)) are only valid when θ is less than or equal to 0.5.
From a practical perspective, an integral over the full spectrum might not be too useful
since practical applications might be only interested in a particular range of spectrum rather
than a full spectrum, such as [10−3, 0.15] proposed in [13]. Moreover, maintaining accuracy
over a certain threshold might be even more practical than an integral. However, we find
SJ is still a very good indicator of performance since it remains almost the same for EEC
bits with different parameter l, which is not surprising since the Fisher information curves
are similar to each other in shape and hence the “area under” the curves are also close to
one another. In Figure 20, we list the values of SJ(l) of different l’s in the legend, where
constant C = 124π
2 ≈ 0.4112, which is a provable limit of SJ(l) when l goes infinity. When
l increases, SJ(l) gets closer to C. In other words, the total information SJ contributed by
each bit is all on the same scale and almost invariant to parameter l. In Section 4.7.4, we
will see that this criteria SJ helps us to differentiate the strengths of different schemes and
guides us in selecting better schemes.
4.6.1.2 The case without “immunity”
We proceed to perform the Fisher information analysis of EEC when the codeword sent
along with the packet is no longer assumed to be immune from corruptions during trans-
mission. The amount of Fisher information contained in each parity bit Xi can be derived
as in (40). We omit the details of this derivation since it is a special case of the Fisher
information analysis (without “immunity”) in the gEEC framework in Section 4.7.2. Note
that, unlike the case with “immunity” where the analysis rigorously holds, the analysis for
the case without “immunity” only rigorously holds when i.i.d. random binary errors are
assumed or random placement of bits are assumed.
θ2JEECi (θ) =
4(li + 1)2(1 − 2θ)2li
1 − (1 − 2θ)2li+2
(40)
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Notice that the RHS of (40) is equal to η(li + 1, θ), only slightly different from (37).
4.6.2 Combining the contributions of the different levels of bits
Since all parity bit are calculated from independent samples with replacement and hence
each of them is independent of every other, the Fisher information of the codeword is





In Figure 21, we plot the Cramer-Rao bound of the EEC scheme with the typical con-
figuration (9 levels, 32 bits per level) and we also plot the Cramer-Rao bound of schemes
with only one level of 32 bits. From Figure 21, we can see that after using the informa-
tion of all levels, the estimation accuracy has the potential to be considerably improved. In
other words, suppose there are two optimal estimators, the first can use only the informa-
tion contained in one level of bits, while the second can use the information contained in
all levels. Then the variance of the first estimator will be four times as large as compared
to the second for most θ values. This means the codeword size has to be four times as large
for the first estimator to match the second in estimation accuracy.
In the design of the original estimator in [13], they first identify the level of bits likely
to be the most accurate for estimating θ and then only use that level of bits for estimation.
Hence only one level of information is used in the final estimate. In Section 3.5 of the
technical report [12], the authors have proposed an improved estimator that can make use
of two neighboring levels of parity bits. In Figure 21, we use θ̂1 to denote the original
one proposed in [13] and use θ̂2 to denote the improved version proposed in [12]. We can
see that neither estimator is close to the Cramer-Rao bound corresponding to the amount
of Fisher information contained in such one or two levels of bits (In other words, their
estimators have not made full use of even the information contained in such one or two
levels of bits) and far from the Cramer-Rao bound corresponding to the Fisher information
of all the codeword bits. We note that when θ is larger than 0.15, the relative MSE falls
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below the Cramer-Rao bound; This is because the estimator is actually very biased in that
region. According to (17), this might lead to smaller MSE.
4.6.3 MLE estimator for EEC scheme
In this section, we present our MLE decoder that matches the Cramer-Rao bound, shown
in the following formula.












1 − (1 − 2θ)li
1 + (1 − 2θ)li
Xi (43)
+ log(1 + (1 − 2θ)li)} (44)
It has been discovered in [24] that the non-informative prior, Jefferys invariant prior, can
remove the O( 1N ) component in bias for the family of exponential models. Here, although
the likelihood function is not a closed-form distribution, we find that Jeffreys prior will
help the MLE estimator to achieve better results. The MLE with the Jefferys prior, denoted
as θ̂MLE j , is















1 − (1 − 2θ)li





+ log(2li(1 − 2θ)li−1)}.
Here p(θ) ∼
√
J(θ), where p(θ) is the a priori distribution of the parameter θ and J(θ)
is the Fisher information calculated in (41). Note that the MLE with Jefferys prior will still
asymptotically reach the Cramer-Rao bound.
4.7 Design and Fisher Information Analysis of Generalized EEC (gEEC)
In the previous section, we showed through Fisher information analysis that the original
decoder for EEC used in [13] is far from optimal and our new decoder is near-optimal (by
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almost matching the Cramer-Rao bound) given the amount of Fisher information contained
in an EEC codeword. Now we would like to find out whether the EEC encoding scheme
is efficient enough by comparing its Fisher information (per bit) with that of EToW. How-
ever, when we were performing the Fisher information analysis of EToW, we discovered
a generalized EEC (gEEC) scheme that can be parameterized into both EEC and EToW.
Fisher information analysis of EToW can thus be generalized to that of gEEC so we shift
our “target” for comparison to gEEC. Through this unified framework of gEEC, we have
found that some parameterizations of the gEEC family contain 25% or more Fisher infor-
mation per bit in their codewords than EEC. In other words, the EEC encoding scheme
is not very efficient either. The discovery of gEEC is important also for another reason:
We have discovered a unified decoder (estimator) for gEEC that is near-optimal (by almost
matching the Cramer-Rao bound) and when parameterized into EToW, is more accurate
than the original EToW decoder proposed in [30]. Strictly speaking, it is not the clear win-
ner however since the original EToW decoder has much lower computational and storage
complexities.
The rest of the section is organized as follows. In Section 4.7.1, we briefly describe
the gEEC encoding scheme by highlighting its differences from and connections to both
EToW and EEC. In Section 4.7.2, we proceed to perform the Fisher information analysis of
its codeword and design its estimator. We will see the gEEC decoder that almost matches
the Cramer-Rao bound in Section 4.8. Finally, we will present the numerical results of the
information contained in gEEC family in Section 4.7.4.
4.7.1 The gEEC Encoding
A gEEC codeword (called sketch) of a packet (viewed as binary vector ~b) consists of m sub-
sketches z1, z2, . . . , zm. The value of sub-sketch zi is set to the number of 1’s contained in
the binary vector generated by sampling li bits from the packet with replacement, which we
refer to as ~bi, and then XOR-ing it with a pseudo random vector ~si bitwise. This operation is
107
the same as in EToW, except that in EToW the value of zi is set to the half of the difference
between the number of 1’s and the number of 0’s. It can be shown that these two types
of encodings can be made equally efficient and statistically equivalent with respect to the
truncation operations (described shortly) with proper parameterizations.
The main difference between EToW and gEEC is that all l′i s have to take the same value
in EToW. This is not an artificially crafted difference because EToW’s decoder, inherited
from ToW and based on the method of moments, imposes this equal length requirement,
while the new decoder we propose for gEEC that we will describe in Section 4.7.2.2, does
not have such a requirement due to its MLE nature. Like in EToW, we use barely enough
bits to encode each sub-sketch and “overflows” are handled in the same way through trunca-
tion. Moreover, different from EToW which needs extra checking bits to detect corruption
inside the sketch, we will see that the estimators provided the gEEC’s framework have
built-in capability to decode the sketches which might suffer corruption in the case without
“immunity”.





1 + si, j
2
) (mod Ki), (45)
where Ki = 2ki , ki is the number of bits allocated to sub-sketch zi. Each si, j is a pre-
computed pseudo-random number uniformly and independently selected from {−1, 1}, the
same as the definition in the tug-of-war sketch [3, 30]. The function 1+si, j2 maps si, j from
{−1, 1} to {0, 1}.
Noticed that here, different from the definition in (23) of Section 4.5,here we directly
define the zi by xor sum and zi is no longer defined in {−2ki−1,−2ki−1 + 1, ..., 2ki−1 − 1}, but
defined in {0, 1, ..., 2ki − 1}. We should say the purpose of this is only to make the formulas
cleaner and is also to be consistent with the definition in [31].
As shown below, the nature of the definition above is a random projection of ~si (only













1 + (2bi, j − 1)si, j
2
(47)
= ~bi · ~si −
1
2




It can be shown that when we allocate only 1 bit for each sub-sketch, the sketch becomes
a parity array and in this case gEEC “degenerates” into a scheme statistically equivalent to
EEC with the same li values. We can also see that gEEC becomes statistically equivalent
to EToW without sketch protection (explained next) when l′i s are set to the same value.
4.7.2 Fisher information analysis
In this section, we analyze the Fisher information contained in each gEEC codeword. Re-
call from Sec. 4.4.1 that in EToW we need to protect the sketch against corruptions during
transmission using lightweight error-detection codes. We will show no such protection is
needed in gEEC because, unlike the EToW decoder, the proposed MLE decoder for gEEC
is robust against such corruptions. In order to simplify the presentation of the analysis,
we first analyze the Fisher information of a gEEC codeword assuming that the codeword
is immune from corruption during transmission in Section 4.7.2.1 and then show how to
remove this assumption in Section 4.7.2.2.
4.7.2.1 The case with “immunity”
Like in Section 4.6, we use ~b′i to denote the set of bits sampled with replacement from the
packet received (subject to corruptions during transmission) that are used to compute the ith
sub-sketch z′i at the receiver side, and use ~bi to denote the corresponding set of bits sampled
from the packet sent (can be different from ~b′i due to corruptions during transmission) that
are used to compute the ith sub-sketch zi at the receiver side. In this section, we derive
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the Fisher information of the sketch under the aforementioned immunity assumption that
these sub-sketches z1, z2, ..., zm will arrive at the receiver without having any of their bits
corrupted during transmission.
The receiver can calculate the difference Xi between z′i and zi
Xi , z′i − zi(mod K), i ∈ [m] (49)
Here K = 2k where k is the number of bits we allocate to each sub-sketch. The effect
of the aforementioned (possible) overflow and resulting truncation is reflected in ”modulo
K”. It can be shown that this observation Xi is the following function of the error vector
~ei (the difference vector between ~bi and ~b′i), where si is the aforementioned pseudorandom
vector over which the sampled bit vectors ~bi and ~b′i are linearly projected:
Xi = ~bi · ~si − ~b′i · ~si(mod K), due to (48) (50)
= ~ei · ~si(mod K). (51)
Since observations X1, X2, ..., Xm are independent random variables, the likelihood
function of the random vector 〈X1, X2, ..., Xm〉 is the product of the likelihood functions
of these random variables. The likelihood function of Xi (for arbitrary i) can be derived as
follows.
For convenience, we drop the subscript from Xi and denote it simply as X. In the
following we will derive the probability mass function (PMF) of X, which takes values from
the set of K = 2k integers {0, 1, ...,K−1}. It can be shown that its PMF can be determined by
a K-dimensional vector ~γ(θ, l) ≡ 〈γ0(θ, l), γ1(θ, l), ..., γK(θ, l)〉 where γi(θ, l) ≡ Pr(X = i|θ, l),
i ∈ [0, 1, ...,K − 1]. Note that each scalar γi is a function of the error rate θ and the number
of bits sampled l (here the subscript i is dropped from li). We show that ~γ(θ, l) can be
computed from the following recurrence relation.
Lemma 5.
~γ(θ, l)1×K = ~γ(θ, l − 1)1×KM(θ)K×K , (52)
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,where M(θ) is the same as the M(θ) defined in (26) of Section 4.5.
M(θ) =

1-θ θ/2 · · · 0 · · · θ/2
θ/2 1-θ θ/2 · · · 0 · · ·
θ/2 1-θ θ/2 · · · 0 · · ·
· · · · · ·
· · · 0 · · · θ/2 1-θ θ/2




The only difference from the definitions of Section 4.5 is in the initial condition of
~gamma, which is
~γ(θ, 0) = [1, 0 · · · , 0]1×K . (54)
here.
Proof. Let ~e = 〈e1, e2, · · · , el〉 and ~s = 〈s1, s2, · · · , sl〉. We define the following interim





Clearly, X = Yl(mod K). Due to the sampling with replacement policy, the increment in
each step ∆Y j = Y j+1 − Y j = e j+1s j+1 is independent of every other. Hence the random vari-
ables {Y j}0≤ j≤l make up a Markov chain. In each step, with probability 1 − θ an unchanged
bit is selected and hence ∆Y j = 0; with probability θ a changed bit is selected, and half of
these increments are +1 and the other half −1 since sk is uniformly at random from {−1, 1}.
Hence the distribution of ∆Y j is:
∆Y j =

−1 with prob θ/2,
0 with prob 1 − θ,
1 with prob θ/2.
(56)
Mapping {Y j}0≤ j≤l into the finite field ZK , formula (56) becomes the transition matrix,
which is the circular matrix M defined in (53). 
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Ω′Diag(d0, d1, . . . , dK−1)Ω (57)
where Ω = {ωik}, ωik = exp(
2πik j
K ), j is the imaginary unit, and di = 1 − αiθ, αi =
2 sin2(iπ/K), which is actually the Fourier transform matrix.
Considering that ~γ(θ, 0) = [1, 0 · · · , 0]1×K , we have




[1, 0, · · · , 0]Ω′Diag(dl0, d
l








1, . . . , d
l
K−1]Ω. (58)
The Fisher information of the gEEC sketch can be calculated as follows:
J(θ, l) = Eθ(
∂
∂θ






















where γ j denotes the jth item in vector ~γ and {~v} j denotes the jth item in vector ~v.
It can be shown that when we set k to 1 (so that gEEC degenerates into EEC), formula
(59), the Fisher information of gEEC codeword is equal to formula (37), that of EEC.
4.7.2.2 The case without immunity
In the previous section, we have performed an Fisher information analysis of gEEC under
the assumption that the codewords (sketches) sent along with the packets are not subject
to corruptions during transmission (i.e., “with immunity”). In reality, these codewords
are certainly not immune to bit errors. In this section, we perform the Fisher information
anaysis without this “immunity assumption”.
Suppose the sender sends out a sub-sketch zi and the receiver receives ži. Now ži may
differ from zi as the “immunity” has been taken away. Having no knowledge of zi, the
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receiver has to use ži and zi′ computed from the received packet to infer the bit error rate
θ. The conditional (upon θ) joint probability mass function of 〈ži, zi′〉 is shown as follows.








Pr(z) Pr(ž|θ, z) Pr(z′|θ, z). (60)
Note that the formula (60) above only holds under the assumption that the binary error
flips on sketch bits and the error flips on data bits are independent, i.e., ž ⊥ z′|θ, z, which
requires either that the binary errors are i.i.d. distributed inside the sketch or that the lo-
cations of all bits participating including the sketch bits are all sampled with replacement
from the packet, which is not possible to be strictly guaranteed in reality. Hence, we read-
ily admit that, different from the analysis for the case with “immunity” which is rigorously
held, the analysis for the case without “immunity” does not model reality perfectly, though
we believe that it should be very close.
The matrix representation of (60) is as follows:
P(θ) f inalK×K ∝ ΛM(θ)
lT(θ)K×K , (61)
In (61), matrix M corresponds to Pr(z′|θ, z) and can be calculated using (57). Matrix Λ
is a diagonal matrix and corresponds to Pr(z). Its diagonal elements can also be calculated
using (58) with θ = 1. We acknowledge that an ulterior motive for us to define zi as the
number of 1’s, rather than the number of 1’s minus the number of 0’s, in the bitwise-XOR
of ~bi and ~si, is that it makes these formulae much “cleaner”.
Matrix T is the transition matrix that corresponds to Pr(ž, q̌|θ, z). Each of its entry Ti j is
defined as follows:
Ti, j = θdi j(1 − θ)k−di j , (62)
where di j is the Hamming distance between the binary representation of i and j.
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All entries in (61) are differentiable and the Fisher information can be derived in a way
similar to (59). In the interest of space the final Fisher information formula is omitted here.
Note that when k = 1, gEEC degenerates to EEC, and the final Fisher information
formula can be shown to be equivalent to EEC’s Fisher information formula (40).
4.7.3 Our MLE Estimators
In this section, we derive the MLE decoder for gEEC that perform much better than both
EEC and EToW decoders, as we will show in Sec. 4.8. Again, we first derive it for the
easier case with “immunity” and then proceed to take the “immunity” away.
In the case with “immunity”, our observations are Xi, which is the difference between
each pair of ži and z′i , i = 1, 2, ...,m, and our goal is to estimate θ. The maximum likelihood
estimator is






Here {~γ(θ, li)}Xi denotes the X
th
i scalar in ~γ and ~γ(θ, l) and J(θ, l) have both been derived
earlier. The MLE estimator with Jeffreys prior (MLE-J) is









We introduce MLE − J because it performs better than the plain vanilla MLE empiri-
cally, which will show in Section 4.8.
Similar to (64), the MLE estimator with Jeffreys prior for the case without immunity is
θ̂ = arg max
θ





where {P(θ, li)}ži,z′i denotes the (ži, z
′
i)
th entry in the probability matrix P.
This estimator will also be evaluated empirically in Section 4.8.
4.7.4 Numerical Results of the Fisher Information contained in the gEEC Family
Fisher information contained in each gEEC’s sub-sketch is determined by two factors:
the sampling group size l and the binary width k. For convenience, this is denoted as
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gEEC(l, k), and a sketch composed of m such sub-sketches is denoted by gEEC(m, l, k).
In Figure 22, we show the impact of different l’s and k’s in the case with immunity.
We observe that, similar to Figure 20, the parameter l only “shifts” the curve. The larger l,
the more resolution on lower θ’s, while the total amount of “information flow” S J remains
almost the same. The parameter k, on the other hand, expands the “span” of the curve,
leading to a wider spread of the estimation power on the spectrum.
To compare the total amount of “information flow” of different parameterizations more
conveniently, we also list the value S J—the area covered by each curve as defined in (39)—
of each parameterization in the legend of the figure, where the constant C is π
2
24 ≈ 0.4112,
the lower limit of the area covered by the EEC bit’s Fisher information curve, as discussed
in Section 4.6. Based on the S J values in Figure 22, we conclude that k = 2 is not able
to bring any additional benefit. In contrast, one sub-sketch with k = 4 can gain more
information over 4 independently coded EEC bits.
The next question we ask is: How much information is lost due to the contamination
of the sketch? To measure this, we plot the Fisher information curve with k = 4 or 6
and l = 2048, 512 or 128 in Figure 23. We observe that the Fisher information curve is
impacted only when θ is not small and the loss of information is also modest. For some
cases, such as k = 6 and l = 128, the total information is improved even when the sketch is
subject to errors.
We summarize the impact of l and k’s on S J by listing the 1kC S
J values of different
parameterizations in Table 14. From the perspective of total information gain S J, more
bits per sub-sketch usually improves the gain. We see that k = 5 gives around 25% more
information per bit in the contaminated case, which can be translated to a similar ratio
of reduction of the sketch size to achieve the same variance bound. It can be also shown
that the performance of one sub-sketch with k = 5 can dominate six one-bit sub-sketches
together.
However, a larger k is not always better. The larger k gets, the wider the span of the
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Case with immunity Case without immunity
k l=128 l=512 l=2048 l=128 l=512 l=2048
2 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
3 1.12 1.12 1.11 1.08 1.10 1.11
4 1.23 1.22 1.22 1.13 1.18 1.21
5 1.24 1.31 1.31 1.16 1.20 1.26
6 1.05 1.30 1.37 1.19 1.21 1.27
7 0.90 1.14 1.36 1.22 1.24 1.27




resolution curve gets, which might cover more range than needed. If l is small (for better
resolution on large θ’s), k should not need to be too large, otherwise it will be wasteful
(such as the k = 6 and l = 128 case in the table). For a typical EEC application in wireless
communications where the primary target parameter range is [10−3, 0.15], the span of k = 5
(or 6) would be sufficient. Moreover, a large k will mean a higher implementation cost for
a relatively modest gain, which will be discussed soon.
4.8 Evaluation
4.8.1 Experimental Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our sketches experimentally and compare it
with the original EEC scheme.
For the EEC scheme, we use the parameters recommended in [13] for Wifi applications,
i.e., with 9 levels and each level comprised of 32 bits. In total the EEC scheme costs 288 bits
per packet and is targeted for estimating error rates in the [10−3, 0.15] region. The authors
of [13] have proposed three different estimators for their scheme. A naive estimator for
θ̂ (BER) is qi/2i (defined in their paper); Two more sophisticated and accurate estimators
are the roots of φ(2i, θ) = qi and φ(2i, θ) = qi/2 + qi−1(1 − qi−1) respectively. We find that
the latter two estimators both have better estimation accuracies than the naive one, and
neither of them dominates the other. For convenience, we use θ̂1 and θ̂2 to denote the latter
estimators, respectively.
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We have actually proposed two approaches. The first is the enhanced tug-of-war (EToW)
sketch, as presented in Section 4.5. The second is the estimator and schemes in the gEEC
framework, as presented in Section 4.7. We emphasize that although EToW can be regarded
one special case in the gEEC framework, it uses a very different estimator with some pros
and cons and hence should be evaluated separately. For both two approaches above, we
aim to answer two questions: (1) How far is the estimator’s real performance from the the-
oretical results? and (2) How does this compare with previously proposed solutions? Each
value in all figures in this section is obtained with 1000 runs in our simulations, in the case
without immunity.
As for the EToW sketch, as analyzed in Section 4.5, the sampling parameter l and
truncation parameter k can be tuned for different target error rate regions. Since we will
show that the experimental results are nearly identical to the analytical results, we present
only the analytical results with two parameter settings: c=16 or 48, l=768, k=5, and one
parity checking bit per counter generated by the matrix [ 0 0 1 1 1 ]. The sketch
with 16 counters consumes only 96 bits per sketch, 33.3% of that consumed by the original
EEC scheme; The sketch with 48 counters consumes 288 bits, the same as the original EEC
scheme.
As for gEEC approach, since we will also show that the experimental results are nearly
identical to the analytical results, we present only the analytical results with the following
parameterizations: the original EEC scheme with the new estimator(288bits), gEEC(16,512,5)
(80bits), gEEC(16,768,6) (96bits),gEEC(56,512,5)(280bits) and gEEC(48,768,6)(288bits).
We will also compare the performance of estimators with or without the Jeffrey’s prior.
As for the performance metric used for comparisons, the comparison metrics that we
use are the relative mean squared error (rMSE, defined as 1
θ
(θ̂ − θ)2), the mean squared error
of log θ̂ (defined as (log θ̂ − log θ)2)), the ratio of large errors (the ratio of θ̂ that are larger
than 2θ or smaller than θ/2), and the relative bias ( θ̂
θ
− 1).As discussed in Section 4.2.3,
although the Cramer-Rao lower bound for the relative MSE of θ̂ (18) and the MSE of log θ̂
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(19) are the same, we prefer to use the statistics of log θ̂ for comparison since it allocates
larger penalty to large deviations. We will also compare the tail probabilities of different
estimator on some θ’s on some representative BER values, such as 0.005 and 0.05.
We will firstly go through the evaluation of EToW sketch in this subsection. One dis-
tinguished feature of the EToW sketch is that its performance is fully predictable.
The experimental results of EToW sketches are shown in Figure 4.8.1. Each curve is
generated from the results obtained from 8000 experiments. We can make two observations
from these results. First, we observe that all experimental results are nearly identical to the
analytical results. Second, we observe that the performance (i.e., estimation accuracy) of
the enhanced tug-of-war sketch of size 96 bits is close to or even better than the original
EEC scheme of size 288 bits in the target error rate region, while the enhanced tug-of-war
sketch of size 288 bits performs way better than the original EEC scheme. To summarize,
our scheme achieves similar BER estimation accuracies with a sketch size that is only 1/3
of that used by the original EEC scheme.
In the next step, we will compare the performance of gEEC sketches and EToW sketch
together.
In Figure 25, we compare the performance of the original 288-bit EEC scheme with
original estimators with three gEEC/EToW configurations, gEEC(16, 768, 5), gEEC(16, 768, 6)
and EToW(16, 768, 5, r = 1), whose total transmission costs are 80, 96 and 96 bits, respec-
tively. We see that our new sketches perform very well in [0.001, 0.15] with much less
transmission overhead than the original EEC, while the performance of the original EEC’s
estimator varies, especially when measured by harsher criteria such as the MSE of log θ̂
and the ratio of large errors.
In Figure 26, we compare the performance of the four estimators of two schemes, the
original EEC and gEEC(56, 512, 5). All four estimators are derived from the newly pro-
posed gEEC framework, two of which use the Jeffreys prior and the other two do not. We
can see that the estimators with Jeffreys prior are generally better in the range where θ is
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relatively large and the inherent resolution of the scheme is relatively weak, no matter if
measured by MSE or by bias. Since estimators with Jeffereys prior are usually empirically
better, we always use that version in other comparisons.
In Figure 27, we compare the performance of four schemes, the original EEC, gEEC(56, 512, 5),
gEEC(56, 768, 6) and EToW(56, 768) with 5-bits per sub-sketch and 1-bit for detecting cor-
ruption, the transmission cost of which are almost the same. The first three use gEEC’s
MLE estimator with Jeffreys prior, while the last one uses EToW’s moment-based estima-
tor. Comparing these figures with Figure 25, we can see that, with the same transmission
cost, the estimation accuracy is substantially improved. Moreover, we can see that the
gEEC(56, 512, 5) and gEEC(56, 768, 6)’s performance are generally better than the others.
In a wide range they can achieve around a 30-50% reduction of MSE, compared with the
EEC scheme with our new estimator. This is not surprising since we have already seen that
a larger k can bring a modest improvement of estimation accuracy. We also observe that
EToW’s performance is only slightly worse, except when θ is close to or larger than 0.1.
Comparing the curves in Figure 25 and Figure 26, we can see that when the total number
of sketches is large, the MLE estimator’s performance is nearly equal to the Cramer-Rao
lower bound, and its bias is also reduced as seen by comparing Figure 25(d) and Fig-
ure 25(d). Note that sometime the MSE of log θ or rMSE might be below the Cramer-Rao
bound when bias is high, which is possible since all curves of Cramer-Rao bound presented
in the figures are for the unbiased estimator.
To summarize our comparisons above, our estimators, especially the ones with Jeffreys
prior, can almost achieve the Cramer-Rao bound empirically. On one hand, gEEC(16, 768, 5)
(which is also EToW’s scheme, just without EToW’s extra error detection bit) can achieve a
similar level of performance as the original EEC scheme with only one-fourth of the sketch
size; on the other hand, with the same budget of transmission cost, the estimation accuracy
of the original EEC scheme (288 bit design) can be greatly improved by our new estima-
tors, and our gEEC design can achieve around 30% additional gain of estimation accuracy.
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Compared to the EToW’s performance, the gEEC’s performance is still better, especially
in the range that θ is relatively large.
4.8.2 Implementation Cost of Estimators and Selection of Parameters
All presentations thus far have focused on the estimation performance. However, the im-
plementation and the computation costs should also be considered.
Firstly, the the implementation of EToW’s estimator is very low, since it only requires
a combination of inner products as well as modulo and other arithmetical operations, all
of which have cost O(n). In practice, the inner product is equivalent to the bit counting
operation. All of these operation took very little time in our experiments and therefore we
do not present any computation time measurements here.
As for the gEEC’s estimator, which is an MLE estimator in nature, it can be imple-
mented as table-based lookup. Whether or not it is enhanced by the Jeffrey’s prior, the
MLE estimator can be transformed in this way:
θ̂MLE = arg max
θ
{A(θ)Y + B(θ)}, (66)
where each entry of Y indicates the count of one particular type of sub-sketch equals to one
particular value. A(θ) and B(θ) are determined by
We can implement (66) as a linear transform of Y, i.e. Ad1×d2Yd2×1 + Bd1×1 and then find
the maximum of the result. Here Ad1×d2 and Bd1×1 are both pre-calculated matrixes.
One of A’s dimensions, d1, is determined by the size of candidate θ’s. For most practical
EEC applications, d1 in the order of hundreds is sufficient since it will be wasteful if it
becomes more fine-grained than the spectrum of estimation.
A’s other dimension, d2, corresponding to the length of Y, depends on the design of
the sketch. Suppose the codeword is composed of c types of sub-sketches: m1 gEEC(l1, k1)
sub-sketches, m2 gEEC(l2, k2) sub-sketches, . . . ,mc gEEC(lc, kc) sub-sketches. In the case
of “immunity” where the estimator can directly infer from the difference between ži and
z′i , d2 equals to
∑c
i=1 (2





since in such a case the estimator should directly infer from the pair of ži and z′i and hence
the table size is squared.
On one hand, the MLE estimator above can be implemented with an extremely low
cost, when all sub-sketches’ k parameters equal 1, which means the scheme degenerates to
the original EEC scheme. In this case, the matrix A can be as small as 9×100 (say, d2=100).
Moreover, some iterative methods similar to the bisection method can be employed to fur-
ther reduce the number of multiplication, add and compare operations to about 90. Further-
more, since our estimator has strong built-in capability to combine the information from
different levels, it can be shown that a 3-level, 96-bit-per-level design performs very closely
to a 9-level 32-bit design, which can reduce the number of the sub-sketch types and hence
even further reduce the cost by two-thirds.
On the other hand, as shown by previous evaluation results, larger values of k in the
sub-sketch, such as 5 or 6, can generally bring around 25% of additional improvement
of estimation accuracy, at the cost of thousands times higher cost in the storage and the
lookups in tables A and B. The computation cost actually remains almost the same since
X is sparse, and we can implement the linear transform by summing up only few rows.
Hence, the applicability of this improvement depends on the application scenario, since
a lookup table of several hundreds KB might be a very small cost for some applications,
but infeasible for others. Also, note that as discussed in Sec. 4.7.4, a large k might not be
necessary if the target range of parameters is not so wide.
There are two middle paths between the cases above. One way is to use the combina-
tions of several sub-sketches with k = 3 or 4 and different l’s, the cost of which is much
smaller than k = 5 since the table size increases exponentially (O(22k)) in the case without
immunity, while the scheme can still receive some gain on estimation accuracy.
Another way is to use the EToW’s scheme and estimator, whose implementation cost
is much lower. The weakness is that the performance is much weaker, especially when the
error rate θ is large.
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In summary, the gEEC framework (including the EToW sketch) can be easily and flex-
ibly configured for different requirements of estimation accuracy. All guidelines discussed
in this section not only hold for θ in the range [0.001, 0.15], but also for the other arbitrary
ranges as needed.
4.9 Conclusions
The seminal work of Chen et al. [13] has opened the door for the design of high-quality er-
ror estimating codes, with applications towards improving wireless network performance.
Chen et al. [13] designed an exceedingly simple code for estimating bit error rates in pack-
ets being transmitted, and it is an open—yet challenging—question whether this code is
optimal in practice.
In this chapter, we firstly cast the recently proposed BER estimation problem as a two-
party computation problem. From a theoretical standpoint, we proved that even when ap-
proximation and randomization are allowed the cost of this problem is Ω(log n), where n
is the length of data transmitted, which explains why both the EEC scheme and the tug-
of-war sketch both need this much overhead. From a practical standpoint we presented
an enhanced tug-of-war (EToW) sketch with significant additional innovations for better
fitting BER estimation applications. The EToW can bring 60% or more reduction of sketch
size and its performance is fully analyzable and easily tunable.
Moreover, we have systematically investigated the design space of error estimating
codes, stemming from the natural question whether EEC achieves the best tradeoff be-
tween the space and estimation accuracy in estimating bit error rates. Along the path of our
exploration using Fisher information analysis, we have demonstrated that EEC decoding
is inefficient, and proposed a new estimator (decoder) that achieves a significantly higher
accuracy. While investigating whether EEC encoding is efficient, we have developed a
generalized coding framework, called generalized EEC, in which existing designs, such as
EEC and EToW, are just degenerate cases. Using this unified framework, we found that
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some parameterization of gEEC similar to EToW can contain around 25% more informa-






























































Figure 21: the empirical performance of EEC’s original estimators and the associated
Cramer-Rao Bound (all levels, each level, and the envelope of only one level/two levels).







































































































































Figure 23: gEEC’s Fisher information: Relationship to l and k in the cases with and with-
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Figure 25: Empirical esults of Estimators: Compare the performance of original EEC
(with original estimator), two gEEC schemes (with much smaller size, 80 and 96 bits re-
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Figure 26: Empirical Results of Estimators: Compare the performance of two types of
gEEC estimators (with or without Jeffrey’s prior) on three schemes including the original













































































































Figure 27: Empirical Results of Estimators: Compare the performance of four schemes
(original EEC, gEEC(56,512,5),gEEC(48,768,6) and EToW), with almost the same size
and using gEEC’s estimator with Jeffrey’s prior, in the case without “immunity”.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORKS
In this dissertation research, we have researched three network sketching problems, namely
the designs and analysis of Bloom Filter, exact active counter array, and error estimating
coding. All these problems require the creation and maintenance of succinct sketches of
packets or flows that will later be queried by the respective applications to extract informa-
tion out. The sizes of sketches is a paramount concern in all these sketching applications.
and even modest reduction of sketch sizes (while delivering the same or better function-
alities and accuracies) could mean considerable savings in precious on-chip memory re-
sources for the first two applications and less transmission overhead for the last one.
We have proposed one or two techniques for each aforementioned problem, along with
rigorous analyses of their performance and the closeness to the optimality. Interestingly,
all these techniques exploit randomization and statistical multiplexing, in a way different
than do other network applications which usually statistically multiplex traffic flows into a
link with fixed bandwidth. In the rank-indexed Bloom filter and the rank-indexed counter
architecture, we statistically pack variable number of fingerprints or counter segments into
a fixed size bucket (Figure 9) and statistically guarantee the number of overflows from
the buckets. In the improved error estimating codes, we statistically pack lower-order bits
(after truncation) into a sub-sketch . Our key findings are listed as follows:
1. Rank-Indexed Bloom Filter Rank-Indexed Bloom Filter, is a new fingerprint hash
table construction that can achieve the combined functionalities of Bloom filters,
counting Bloom Filters, and several other variants. It inherits all the benefits from
the fingerprint hash-table approach and hence support both deletion and query of
associate value, while also has the advantage of less storage cost and better memory
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locality. Since the rank-indexing technique is almost orthogonal to d-left hashing,
we can combine these two techniques together to achieve more memory savings at
the slight cost of decreased memory locality and increased amortized memory access
cost. We have also developed rigorous analysis of our bloom filter’s performance.
2. BRICK: an exact and active counter architecture BRICK (Bucketized Rank In-
dexed Counters), is a novel exact active statistics counter architecture that can very
efficiently store large arrays of variable length counters entirely in SRAM while sup-
porting extremely fast increments and lookups. The high memory (SRAM) efficiency
is achieved through the rank-indexing technique and the statistical multiplexing tech-
nique similar to Rank-Indexed Bloom Filter, which by grouping a fixed number of
randomly selected counters into a bucket, allows us to tightly bound the amount
of memory that needs to be allocated to each bucket. The statistical guarantees of
BRICK are proven using some more theory including stochastic ordering theory and
probabilistic tail bound techniques. The performance is verified by simulation using
real-world Internet traffic traces .
3. Error Estimating Coding Error estimating Coding was originally proposed in the
seminal work of Chen et al. [13]. In this thesis, we have designed a new estimator for
the original EEC solution in [13] and designed two new sketch data structures for
estimating BERs with estimators, namely Enhanced Tug-of-War(EToW) sketch and
the generalized EEC (gEEC) family of sketches. The performances of our proposed
techniques are close to each other (with up to 25% difference) while all of them
are much better than that of the original algorithm (up to 70% improvement). We
have established asymptotic lower bounds for error estimating code through Fisher
information and Cramer-Rao bound analyses.We found that the original EEC scheme
(with original estimator) is asymptotically the optimal but not in the constant factor.
Our techniques, in comparison, can match the Cramer-Rao bound asymptotically
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and empirically. In addition, all schemes and estimators’s performance are analyzed,
proved, and verified through experiments.
As for the future work, I consider the following directions promising and interesting:
1. Improving and extending the rank-indexing techniques One major contribution of
this thesis is the rank-indexing techniques with statistical multiplexing for Bloom fil-
ter and counter array problems. Rank-indexing is indeed a powerful indexing scheme
that has much much smaller overhead than naı̈ve pointer-based indexing. However,
rank-indexing scheme does have its weakness: it incurs the overhead of memory
moves during insertions and deletions. We wonder whether there can be some alter-
native schemes that can achieve better tradeoffs between rank-indexing and the naı̈ve
pointer-based indexing.
We are also interested in applying the combination of rank-indexing technqiue with
statistical multiplexing on other application areas where dynamic indexing and man-
agement of small chunks of memory are needed, such as the memory management
for packet buffers.
2. Comparison and combination of sampling & streaming During the research on
error estimating codes, we noticed some interesting connections between sampling
and streaming. First, our results reveal an important fact that data streaming, where
every bit(or item) participates in the sketch calculation, doesn’t necessarily improve
the results significantly. For certain applications where users might be interested only
in better estimation accuracies when the parameter at issue lies within a particular
range,combining sampling and streaming together might deliver even better results.
Hence we are interested in extending this idea for some other data streaming problem
such as the sketches in [15] and enable the users to tune the configuration of the
sketch towards better space efficiency.
Moreover, I also noticed that an interesting fact from Section 4.5.1, where I find
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that the streaming of the entire packet, which can be viewed as sampling all bits
without replacement, performs empirically better than sampling the same number of
bits with replacement. However, sampling with replacement is much easier to be
analyzed and hence employed throughout our two schemes, EToW and gEEC. We
are interested in further analyzing the difference between sampling with and without
replacement from an information theoretic perspective. We hope that the mathemati-
cal techniques developed in [68], where an inequality connecting sampling with and
without replacement is proved, will provide a starting point for this exploration.
3. Error Estimating Codes In this thesis, we have proposed two error estimating
coding schemes, namely EToW and gEEC, from an algorithmic perspective, and
verified their performance by extensive comparison of the statistics and the CDF
of theoretical and experimental results. We are interested in collaborating with some
other research groups to implement and evaluate our EEC codes in some real wireless
settings.
We also noticed that, although we proved the asymptotic lower bound in Section 4.3
and had the Cramer-Rao lower bound for all proposed schemes, we have not so far
proved that our gEEC sketch family either reaches or be close to the non-asymptotic
lower bound. We are curious whether there are sketching techniques that can achieve
higher information density (i.e. higher amount of Fisher information per sketch bit).
We are also curious whether we can find an exact (i.e. non-asymptotic) lower bound
for the EEC problem, even for a particular family of sketches.
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